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The general paucity of authoritative mechanisms to inter-
pret the four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Pro-
tocols presents an obstacle to the development of international 
humanitarian law (IHL), the body of law designed to regulate 
the conduct of belligerents and to protect certain categories of 
persons during warfare.1 This Article assesses the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s historical, current, and potential role in filling 
this gap. How willing is the Court to engage humanitarian law 
issues and how thorough is its treatment of them? What has 
the Court contributed to the development of humanitarian law? 
These questions demand primarily descriptive answers. As 
courts and tribunals around the world grapple with thorny 
questions of humanitarian law, the experience of the U.S. Su-
preme Court may be, at turns, instructive and cautionary. But 
underneath these descriptive questions lies a partially norma-
tive one: what role should the Supreme Court play among other 
law-declaring fora in interpreting and developing humanitarian 
law? 
The Supreme Court appears reluctant to invoke the Gene-
va Conventions. In fact, it has referenced Geneva law in only 
ten cases: seven cases reference the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and the remaining three reference the Conventions of 
1929 and 1864.2 In four of these ten cases, however, the con-
 
 1. For a brief discussion of the sources of humanitarian law and relevant 
interpretive bodies, see DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 4–17 (Adam Rob-
erts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000). 
 2. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 817, 825 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dis-
senting); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 681 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 567, 571–72, 589, 604, 612, 619–20, 625–33, 637, 642, 654, 694, 706, 
715–20, 724–25, 728–29 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
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ventions receive only fleeting mention in contexts unrelated to 
armed conflict.3 In another case, Geneva law surfaces only in 
dissent.4 Throughout its history, therefore, the Court has made 
explicit, substantive reference to Geneva law in only five cases. 
The Geneva Conventions, of course, are not the end of the 
story. Treaties stemming from the Hague Conferences of 1899 
and 1907 as well as some customary rules also combine to form 
the corpus of humanitarian law.5 The Court has referenced 
Hague law in a total of sixteen cases, including three already 
mentioned,6 placing the number of cases in which at least one 
 
507, 515, 520–21, 538, 549–51, 587, 597 (2004) (plurality opinion); Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), abrogated 
by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 831 n.34 (1988); Dep’t of Emp’t v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359 & n.8 
(1966); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 767, 785, 789 (1950); FTC v. 
A.P.W. Paper Co., 328 U.S. 193, 196 n.1, 199, 200 n.5, 203 & n.10 (1946); In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 6, 15–16, 20, 21 & n.8, 22–23, 24 & n.10 (1946); id. at 
36–37 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 57–58, 72 n.36, 73, 74 & n.38, 77–78, 81 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). This list does not include Justice Thomas’s recent 
dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari in Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 
1002 passim (2010), discussed in Part II.C.4, nor does it include Justice Breyer’s 
passing reference to Geneva law in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. 
Ct. 2705, 2739 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). “Geneva law” is herein used to 
refer to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Convention of 1929 re-
lating to armed conflict. 
 3. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 389, 390 n.10 (citing Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, as one of “three leading human rights treaties 
ratified or signed by the United States [to] explicitly prohibit juvenile death 
penalties”); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831 n.34 (same); Dep’t of Emp’t, 385 U.S. at 
359 & n.8 (recognizing that the American Red Cross was devised, in part, “to 
meet this Nation’s commitments under various Geneva Conventions” and cit-
ing Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1929, and 1949); A.P.W. Paper Co., 328 U.S. 
at 199, 200 & n.5 (describing the origins of the Red Cross organization and 
quoting the 1929 Geneva Convention’s provision for the exclusive use of the 
name and emblem of the Red Cross). 
 4. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 817, 825 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 5. See generally DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 1, at 47–
730 (compiling nearly 700 pages of treaties and other documents that comprise 
the law of war). 
 6. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 707 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 442 n.2 
(1964); United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199 n.4 (1964); Sch. Dist. of Ab-
ington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 297 n.72 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 19 n.2 (1953); Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.7 (1952); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 
348 n.13 (1952); Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 72 n.1 (1942); Ex parte Quirin, 
317 U.S. 1, 30 n.7, 34, 38 (1942); Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 
215, 226 & n.* (1926); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 299, 301 
(1918); Berg v. British & African Steam Navigation Co. v. United States, 243 
U.S. 124, 150–51 (1917); MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 425–26 
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member of the Court explicitly has considered the principal 
humanitarian law treaties at only twenty-three. The Court’s 
references to the customary laws of war, however, are more 
numerous. Still, while it has referenced the “law of war” in over 
one hundred cases, most such references are not to law of a dis-
tinctly “humanitarian” character.7 The Court’s long history of 
reliance on the “law of war” thus reveals a similar paucity of 
references to what can be more narrowly defined as the “hu-
manitarian” law of war.  
Yet this relatively small body of humanitarian law juris-
prudence is wide-ranging. It encompasses a broad number of 
substantive provisions of humanitarian law and arises in a va-
riety of doctrinal contexts: the Court has invoked Hague and 
Geneva law in interpreting the Eighth Amendment bar on 
“cruel and unusual” punishment,8 as guidelines in fashioning 
process requirements for military tribunals,9 and in adjudicat-
ing petitions for writs of habeas corpus.10  
The jurisprudence reveals several distinct patterns in the 
Court’s approach to humanitarian law issues. First, the Court 
is loath to rest its decisions on humanitarian law treaties.11 
The Court generally invokes humanitarian law as second-level 
authority, which it scrupulously observes as being incorporated 
into domestic law by statute or executive pronouncement.12 
Second, even where the Court does not rest its decision on hu-
 
(1913). The foregoing does not duplicate cases that cite both Geneva and Hague 
law, of which there are but three: Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603, 604 & n.36 (plu-
rality opinion); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; and Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8, 14, 15–
16; id. at 36–37 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 7. E.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762 (“[T]he Court addressed whether 
habeas corpus jurisdiction extended to enemy aliens who . . . violat[ed] the 
laws of war.”). 
 8. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831 n.34 (considering the implications of 
the juvenile death penalty); see also Stanford, 492 U.S. at 390 n.10. 
 9. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631–33. 
 10. E.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 705 (2008). 
 11. Humanitarian law treaties are not unique in this respect—at least for 
certain portions of the Court’s history. See Paul B. Stephan, Treaties in the 
Supreme Court: 1946–2000 (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 20), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559151 (“What [the Court] 
did not do [during this period] is allow treaties unaccompanied by statutory 
implementation to serve as a basis for constraining the treaty-maker, namely 
the federal government.”).  
 12. E.g., Hamdan 548 U.S. at 633 (“[I]t appears the Government ‘re-
gard[s] the provisions of [Protocol I of the Geneva Convention of 1949] as an 
articulation of safeguards to which all persons . . . are entitled.’” (quoting Wil-
liam H. Taft IV, Current Pressures on International Humanitarian Law: The 
Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 322 (2003))). 
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manitarian law, it generally offers some degree of analysis, as 
opposed to rejecting humanitarian law claims out of hand. This 
analysis, however, suffers from a reticence explicitly to engage 
the entire corpus of humanitarian law and a tendency to refer-
ence discrete principles without providing the necessary con-
text. Third, the Court has historically referred to humanitarian 
law for purposes of definition, either of particular concepts, or 
to assess the charges levied against an individual challenging 
his trial by military tribunal.13  
This Article offers a comprehensive assessment of the Su-
preme Court’s approach to humanitarian law as embodied in 
the Hague and Geneva Conventions.14 But first a cautionary 
note is in order. This review is necessarily underinclusive in 
that it does not consider cases in which humanitarian law is-
sues were briefed but not addressed in the Court’s opinions. To 
this extent, this Article does not offer a full picture of the 
Court’s reluctance to engage humanitarian law arguments. 
Still, focusing on what the Court has actually said about IHL is 
a necessary step in understanding the Court’s place among 
other law-declaring fora—national and international courts, 
treaty bodies, etc.—in interpreting this crucial body of law. And 
while the Court’s global influence may be waning, the United 
States continues to play a major role in the development of cus-
tomary international law.15 A close look at the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of humanitarian law thus provides a useful window 
onto its potential customary development.  
 
 13. E.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 passim (1946) (analyzing how and 
why the Geneva Convention did not apply). 
 14. For a broader discussion about the role of U.S. courts in interpreting 
IHL, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, International Humanitarian Law in the Courts 
of the United States: Yamashita, Filartiga, and 911, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 1 (2004). This Article does not wade into the heated debate about the mer-
its of U.S. courts’ use of international and foreign law. For background, see 
Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, 
and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, “A Decent Respect to the 
Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Consti-
tutional Adjudication (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt 
.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?filename=sp_07_30_10.html. 
 15. See Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Custom?, in UNITED STATES 
HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 317, 319 (Michael 
Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (noting the United States’ role in shaping cus-
tomary international law); Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, a Longtime Beacon, Is 
Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at A1, available at 
2008 WLNR 17704106 (“[A] diminishing number of foreign courts seem to pay 
attention to the writings of American justices.”). 
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Part I of this Article assesses the Court’s historical re-
course to the customary “laws of war,” situating the Court’s 
first engagement with “humanitarian” law in the context of its 
lengthy evolution. Part II assesses the Court’s treatment of law 
arising from the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Part III 
turns to the Court’s reliance on the Geneva Conventions of 
1864, 1929, and 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. The 
Conclusion offers a macroscopic analysis of the Court’s ap-
proach and conclusions as to the Court’s role in developing hu-
manitarian law. In short, the Court appears institutionally ill-
suited to the task of interpreting and developing IHL. Its anal-
ysis is sometimes haphazard, and never comprehensive. Yet the 
Court has invoked this body of law from its earliest days, and 
humanitarian law questions are sure to arise more frequently 
as U.S. courts continue to grapple with legal issues stemming 
from international terrorism. The Supreme Court’s preemi-
nence in a state critical to shaping the international legal order 
will ensure that it remains an important voice. 
I.  EARLY YEARS OF THE COURT AND THE “LAW OF 
WAR”   
The Supreme Court has invoked the law of war since short-
ly after its inception.16 Yet the term “law of war” is not a pre-
cise analog for the body of law studied in this Article. As a mas-
sive corpus of customary rules, treaties, and other documents, 
the law of war has been evolving with civilization since its ear-
liest days,17 and has come to include more than what might be 
strictly termed “humanitarian” law.18 While this body of law is 
no monolith, the Supreme Court tends to refer generally to the 
“laws of war.” Moreover, commentators often use the terms 
“law of war” and “humanitarian law” interchangeably.19 There-
fore, several terminological distinctions will be useful before 
evaluating the Court’s approach.  
 
 16. See infra note 23. 
 17. See, e.g., L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
15–53 (2000). 
 18. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 1, at 2 (“A possible dis-
advantage of the term [‘humanitarian law’] is that it could be thought to ex-
clude some parts of the laws of war (such as the law on neutrality) whose pri-
mary purpose is not humanitarian.”). 
 19. E.g., Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian 
Law: Challenges from the “War on Terror,” 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55, 70 
n.1 (2003) (“The terms ‘international humanitarian law,’ ‘humanitarian law,’ 
‘law of armed conflict,’ ‘jus in bello,’ and ‘law of war’ are all interchangeable.”). 
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A. SITUATING HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE LAW OF WAR 
The law of war is comprised of two distinct spheres of law: 
that governing resort to the use of force ( jus ad bellum) and 
that governing conduct in war ( jus in bello).20 Commentators 
often use the term “humanitarian law” to refer to the jus in bel-
lo. The humanitarian jus in bello is designed to ameliorate the 
human suffering intrinsic to war, and has its principal modern 
expression in the bodies of law developed in the Hague and Ge-
neva.21 While these two bodies of law focus on distinct aspects 
of humanitarian protections, the separate treatment of them in 
this Article is a function of organizational utility, not substan-
tive precision: commentators have long noted the artificiality of 
drawing a sharp distinction between the two given their large 
substantive overlap.22 
The Court first referenced the “laws of war” in 179523 and 
has continued to do so throughout its history in more than one 
hundred cases, most recently in 2008.24 Only a small number of 
these references, however, relate to what might be strictly 
termed “humanitarian law.”  
The Supreme Court’s first references to the “law of war” 
adequately demonstrate the flexibility of the term. Of the cap-
ture by colonists of a British ship pursuant to an act of Con-
gress,25 the Court stated “whether prize or no prize, is a part of 
the power and law of war . . . and must be governed by the law 
of nations.”26 The “law of war” here refers to the elaborate set of 
customary rules governing the capture of property on the high 
seas during warfare, or the law of maritime prize, that had 
 
 20. E.g., HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: 
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE 1 (2d ed. 1998). 
 21. See, e.g., id. at 1–2. 
 22. Id. at 2. 
 23. Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 148 (1795); see also Penhallow v. 
Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 74 (1795) (referencing “law of war”). 
 24. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762 (2008) (referring to an earlier 
decision). Justice Thomas, in a dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari in 
Noriega v. Pastrana, referenced the executive’s stated policy to treat detainees 
in accordance with “standards that draw on the ‘laws of war’ as those laws 
have developed over time and have periodically been codified in treaties such 
as the Geneva Conventions.” 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1008 (2010) (citation and quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 25. Congress passed the act in retaliation for similar measures imple-
mented by the British Parliament. Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 53–57. 
 26. Id. at 74 (citation omitted). 
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been developing since the early Middle Ages.27 Though the law 
of maritime prize is a component of public international law re-
lating to conduct in war,28 and hence conceptually part of the 
jus in bello, as described below it cannot usefully be classified 
as a component of humanitarian law. Indeed, the Court itself 
has characterized the law of nations as being comprised of two 
principal components in the early years of the Republic: that 
governing behavior between states and another, “more pedes-
trian,” component concerned with regulating individuals out-
side domestic boundaries in matters touching mercantile rela-
tionships, shipwrecks, and commerce.29 This “pedestrian” 
component must be disentangled from its humanitarian coun-
terpart. 
The “humanitarian” component of the jus in bello seeks ex-
plicitly to balance military necessity against human suffering.30 
The Court has long recognized this fundamental tradeoff. 
Speaking of the Revolutionary War, Justice Iredell remarked in 
1796 that a  
means of defence which, when inferior objects were in view, might not 
be strictly justifiable, might, in such an extremity, become so, on the 
great principle on which the laws of war are founded, self-
preservation; an object that may be attained by any means, not incon-
sistent with the eternal and immutable rules of moral obligation.31 
 
 27. See generally J.H.W. VERZIJL ET AL., 11 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE LAW OF MARITIME PRIZE (1992) (providing an 
extensive history of the law of prize). Maritime prize law has been character-
ized as “the most obscure and extraneous doctrinal realm in public interna-
tional law today.” David J. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize Law, 9 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 31, 31 (1995) (book review). The Court’s early references 
to the law of war in this connection, however, demonstrate the expansiveness 
of the phrase, and the terminological complexities inherent in a historical 
analysis of the Court’s approach to humanitarian law.  
 28. Bederman, supra note 27, at 33. 
 29. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004). 
 30. J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians 
Accompanying the Armed Services, 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 182 (2005) (“The laws 
of war have long acknowledged that injury to civilian objectives incidental to 
attack on lawful military objectives may be legitimate if not excessive[,] 
. . . . [which] calls for a balancing test to weigh military advantage against civil-
ian harm.”). 
 31. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 263–64 (1796). This reference ap-
pears in a discussion of whether customary law authorized the United States 
to confiscate British debts during the Revolutionary War. While the statement 
is plainly distinct from the Hague and Geneva branches of the jus in bello that 
would crystallize over one hundred years later, it nonetheless demonstrates 
the fundamental tradeoff inherent in humanitarian law: on the one hand, ne-
cessity or expediency during war, and on the other hand, the dictates of hu-
manity or “morality.” 
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The emergence of positive humanitarian law reflects an effort 
to codify these tradeoffs. If the “great principle . . . [of] self-
preservation” is reflected in the sanction of lawful killing em-
bedded in the very fabric of the law of war,32 the “immutable 
rules of moral obligation” are epitomized by the Martens clause 
of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, which invokes the 
“usages established among civilized peoples,” the “laws of hu-
manity,” and the “dictates of the public conscience.”33 
The term “humanitarian law” is a relatively recent, and 
somewhat controversial, development.34 It encompasses the 
rules of international law designed to regulate both the means 
and methods of warfare, and the treatment of particular classes 
of individuals during war.35 On the one hand, many commenta-
tors use the terms “humanitarian law,” “law of war,” and “law 
of armed conflict” interchangeably.36 On the other hand, some 
commentators and international actors, including the U.S. De-
partment of State, reject the use of the term “humanitarian 
law” in favor of the terms “law of war” or “law and customs of 
 
 32. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, 
and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1755–57 (2009) (discussing provi-
sions implicitly recognizing that warfare involves killing the enemy). 
 33. E.g., Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Fourth Hague Conven-
tion] (“Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High 
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in 
the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain 
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as 
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws 
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”). See generally Theodor 
Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public 
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78 (2000) (discussing the history and evolution 
of the Martens clause). 
 34. The term was coined by Jean Pictet. See JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT 
AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 (1985). It appears 
in several international agreements, including the 1977 Final Act of the dip-
lomatic conference that concluded the 1977 Geneva Protocols I and II, and the 
1993 ICTY and 1994 ICTR statutes. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, 
supra note 1, at 2 n.3. 
 35. See THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 8–9 
(Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). 
 36. E.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Se-
curity Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 675, 761 (2004) (noting the debate on the issue and using the terms in-
terchangeably); Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Ter-
ror: Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 683, 685 n.4 
(2009) (“Although I prefer the terms ‘law of war’ and ‘law of armed conflict,’ I 
use them interchangeably with the more fashionable expression—
‘international humanitarian law.’”).  
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war.”37 In this view, the term “humanitarian law” is simply a 
more fashionable stand-in for the classic “law of war” formula-
tion,38 whose substitution runs the risk of idealizing what must 
remain a self-consciously practical body of international law.39 
The term “law of war,” in other words, better conveys that the 
law’s application is generally in the rational self-interest of 
those applying it,40 and that diaphanous appeals to morality 
risk diluting this logic. The very language with which commen-
tators and courts approach this body of law, therefore, is itself 
controversial.41  
The Court has never used the term “humanitarian” to de-
scribe this body of law; rather, it either refers specifically to the 
constitutive treaties of humanitarian law or, more generally, to 
the “laws of war.” That said, this Article uses the term because 
it is particularly helpful in evaluating the Court’s jurispru-
dence. As described above, the term “humanitarian” is analyti-
cally useful to distinguish between different components of the 
jus in bello as it existed in the early years of the Republic. 
Hence, whatever the merits of the argument—that the use of 
the term “humanitarian” threatens the law’s efficacy—a mono-
lithic conception of the “law of war” is not useful in evaluating 
 
 37. See Letter from John B. Bellinger, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
and William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, to Jakob Kellen-
berger, President, ICRC (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink 
.mil/home/pdf/Customary_International_Humanitiarian_Law.pdf (“Although 
[the ICRC study of Customary International Law] uses the term ‘international 
humanitarian law,’ we prefer the ‘law of war’ or the ‘laws and customs of 
war.’”); see also David E. Graham, The Law of Armed Conflict and the War on 
Terrorism, in ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 331, 
331 (Richard B. Jaques ed., 2006) (arguing that no one has advanced a defini-
tive explanation for the use of the term “international humanitarian law”); 
Adam Roberts, Implementation of the Laws of War in Late-Twentieth-Century 
Conflicts, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 359, 
381 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998). 
 38. Rosen, supra note 36, at 685 n.4. 
 39. Roberts, supra note 37, at 381. 
 40. For the classic formulation of the argument casting the law of war as 
utilitarian calculus, see R.B. Brandt, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, 1 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 145, 145–65 (1972). 
 41. For his part, Pictet explains the utility of the term as follows: 
When [I] first proposed the term ‘humanitarian law’ [I] was told that 
it combined two ideas of different natures, one legal and the other 
moral. Well, the provisions constituting this discipline are in fact a 
transposition into international law of moral, and more specifically, of 
humanitarian concerns. Accordingly, the name seems satisfactory. 
PICTET, supra note 34, at 1. 
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the Supreme Court’s approach to this body of law.42 The matter 
is further complicated because the Court uses the term to refer 
not just to international humanitarian law, including rules cod-
ified in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, but also to this 
body of law as interpreted and developed by U.S. military 
courts and tribunals.43 Therefore, in assessing the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of the “law of war,” there exists a prelimi-
nary task of understanding to which body of law the Court is 
referring. This Article uses the term “humanitarian law” to aid 
that process. 
In the wake of the U.S. Civil War, counsel for the United 
States described the law of war for the Court as “the laws 
which govern the conduct of belligerents towards each other 
and other nations, flagranti bello.”44 Helpful as far as it goes, 
this definition offers a useful starting point. The Court purports 
to recognize and apply this body of law from its earliest days.45 
 
 42. As will become evident in Part I.B, infra, these terminological distinc-
tions are of particular relevance in assessing the Court’s historical treatment 
of the law of war. 
 43. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 689 (2006) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (defining the “common law of war as it pertains to offenses triable 
by military commission” as “derived from the experience of our wars and our 
wartime tribunals and the laws and usages of war as understood and practiced 
by the civilized nations of the world” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; see also John Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power: 
The Intersection of Human Rights Law and the Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial Context, 40 ISRAEL L. REV. 396, 410 n.39 
(2007) (noting ambiguity as to the meaning of the term in the U.S. legal sys-
tem). The blurring of the distinction between the law of nations, of which the 
law of war forms a part, and its interpretation and elaboration by domestic 
courts has long been a feature of the Court’s treatment of the law of war. See, 
e.g., The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 382, 384 (1814) (“The municipal forfeiture 
under the non-intercourse act, was absorbed in the more general operation of 
the law of war. The property of an enemy seems hardly to be within the pur-
view of mere municipal regulations; but is confiscable under the jus gen-
tium.”); Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 256 n.* (1808) (“[France], as 
Britain did in our revolutionary war, clothes her prohibitions in the shape of 
municipal regulations, thereby pretending to assert her claim of jurisdiction 
over her revolted subjects . . . but we . . . recognize her rights only so far as 
they are sanctioned by the laws of a war of the nature of that in which she is 
engaged, and no further; and they do not bind us further than the laws of war 
. . . .”), overruled in part by Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810). 
 44. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 14 (1866) (quoting the argument 
of the United States). 
 45. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1942) (“[F]rom the very beginning 
of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including 
that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the 
status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.”). 
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It is to the content of this recognition and application that this 
Article now turns. 
B. THE COURT’S EARLY REFERENCES 
It is helpful to view the Court’s early references to the law 
of war against the background of the development of modern 
humanitarian law. In contrast to the well-developed customary 
law of naval captures, there was little effort to codify the rules 
of war on land until the 1863 Code of Francis Lieber.46 The Lie-
ber Code helped to spur the eventual development of the first 
treaty for the law of war on land at Brussels in 1874 and, later, 
the first Hague Conference in 1899.47 The Lieber Code thus 
provides a useful milestone in evaluating the Court’s jurispru-
dence. These developments contributed to a shift in the norma-
tive foundations of the law of war during this time, as humani-
tarian concerns gradually assumed greater importance.48 The 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reflects this development. As 
described below, before the Lieber Code most of the Court’s ref-
erences to the “laws of war” refer to aspects that cannot proper-
ly be understood as “humanitarian.” Rather, the focus in these 
cases is mercantile commerce. 
The early Court identified numerous such propositions. 
The most common context in which the Court appealed to the 
law of war is the seizure of property, particularly the capture of 
vessels or cargo under the law of prize, which is the elaborate 
set of customary rules governing the seizure of property on the 
high seas.49 The Court recognized, for example, that the law of 
 
 46. GENERAL ORDER NO. 100: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF 
ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lie-
ber Code], reprinted in 2 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER 
245–74 (1881); see also GREEN, supra note 17, at 29 n.63 (identifying the Lie-
ber Code as the “first modern codification of the law of armed conflict”). 
 47. For a concise history of the laws of war, see DAVID J. BEDERMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 237–44 (2006). For a more thorough 
treatment, see GREEN, supra note 17, at 20–53. 
 48. See THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 139–40 
(1998); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 239, 244–45 (2000). 
 49. E.g., United States v. Reading, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1, 10 (1855) (“[B]y 
the law of war either party to it may receive and list among his troops such as 
quit the other, unless there has been a previous stipulation that they shall not 
be received.”); De Valengin’s Adm’rs v. Duffy, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 282, 289–90 
(1840) (“It has been frequently held, that the device . . . of covering the proper-
ty as neutral when in truth it was belligerent, is not contrary to the laws of 
war, or the laws of nations.”); The Caledonian, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 100, 102 
(1819) (“By the general law of war, every American ship, sailing under the 
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war permitted the seizure and destruction of enemy property.50 
Outside the prize context, the Court invoked the law of war 
with respect to commerce and trade relations,51 the validity of 
contracts,52 and title or right to land.53 Indeed, the Court seem-
 
pass, or license of the enemy, or trading with the enemy, is deemed to be an 
enemy’s ship, and forfeited as prize.”); The St. Lawrence, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 
120, 122 (1815) (referring to traffic in goods as being “not only prohibited by 
the law of war, but [also] by the municipal regulations of his adopted country,” 
thus condemning it to forfeiture); The Frances, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 335, 342 
(1814) (referring to instructions by the President to privateers of the United 
States giving them authority “to capture all property liable to capture by the 
laws of war”); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 260 (1814) (“If Jones had a 
right to stop these goods in tranitu, so had the United States, who, by the laws 
of war, succeeded to his rights.”); Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458, 
488 (1806) (“It is well known, that a vessel libelled as enemy’s property, is 
condemned as prize . . . . If, for example, a search be resisted, or an attempt be 
made to enter a blockaded port, the laws of war, as exercised by belligerents, 
authorize a condemnation as enemy’s property . . . .”); Hannay v. Eve, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 242, 247 (1806) (holding the contract invalid as fraud even though 
“[t]he agreement to save the ship and cargo, under the semblance of a con-
demnation, was not, in itself, an immoral act; it was, as has been truly said, a 
stratagem which the laws of war would authorize”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 1, 17 (1801) (recounting that the capture of a neutral vessel was to 
be judged “according to the laws of war, that is, according to the law of nations 
as applicable to a state of war”); The Amelia, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 34, 35 (1800); 
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 148 (1795); Penhallow v. Doane’s 
Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 74 (1795). 
 50. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 122–23 (1814) (“That 
war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the 
property of the enemy wherever found, is conceded. The mitigations of this rig-
id rule, which the humane and wise policy of modern times has introduced in-
to practice, will more or less affect the exercise of this right, but cannot impair 
the right itself.”). As Brown illustrates, in the early nineteenth century there 
were no law-of-war limits on the power to seize and destroy enemy property. 
Not until the advent of the Lieber Code was this principle subject to formal 
limits. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The 
Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 
213, 217 (1998). 
 51. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 77 (1804) 
(“By the general laws of war, a belligerent has a right not only to search for 
her enemy, but for her citizens trading with her enemy.”); see also United 
States v. Guillem, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 47, 59 (1850) (“Whether or not gold and 
silver are to be considered as merchandise in regard to the laws of war, will 
depend on the purposes for which they are shipped.”). States seized enemy 
property to weaken the adversary’s military strength. Hence, the law of war 
relating to commerce cannot be disconnected from its content as to seizures. 
See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671–72 (1862) (noting that 
the law of war recognizes the right of a belligerent to capture the property of 
an enemy on the high seas as a means to “cut these sinews of power” rooted in 
wealth, the products of agriculture, and commerce). 
 52. White v. Burnley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 235, 249 (1857) (“When one na-
tion is at war with another nation, all the subjects or citizens of the one are 
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ingly framed its analysis of conduct during armed conflict as 
involving a distinct, parallel system of laws, rights, and obliga-
tions.54  
In addition to the law of war’s content as to property, 
commerce, and contracts, the early Court made several refer-
ences to the rights and duties of belligerents. In United States 
v. Reading, for example, the Court noted that by the law of war 
“either party to [the conflict] may receive and list among his 
troops such as quit the other, unless there has been a previous 
stipulation that they shall not be received.”55 The Court has al-
so affirmed the basic principle that the law of war exempts bel-
ligerents for certain acts done during war.56  
As to domestic applicability, the Court’s early interpreta-
tion seems to be that the law of war was binding only to the ex-
tent that Congress had declared war.57 Similarly, the Court 
 
deemed in hostility to the subjects or citizens of the other; they are personally 
at war with each other, and have no capacity to contract.”); Scholefield v. Ei-
chelberger, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 586, 593 (1833) (declining to adopt an exception to 
the doctrine that “during a state of hostility, the citizens of the hostile states 
are incapable of contracting with each other . . . . [S]uch a relaxation of the 
laws of war is not to be inferred from ordinary circumstances . . . .”); Patton v. 
Nicholson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 204, 207 n.9 (1818) (stating that an act of Con-
gress prohibiting the use of certain licenses issued by belligerent governments 
were “merely cumulative upon the pre-existing law of war” and that “as a [cor-
ollary] from this principle . . . a contract for the purchase or sale of such a li-
cense is void as being founded on an illegal consideration”). The notion that 
the law of war provides that all citizens of belligerent states are presumed to 
be personally at war with one another exposes a fundamental difference be-
tween this usage of the term and the Court’s later usage, consistent with the 
evolution of a distinctly humanitarian law of war: IHL emphatically distin-
guishes between combatants and noncombatants. Only belligerents are 
deemed to be at war with one another. 
 53. See United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17, 359 (1862) (con-
sulting writers on the laws of war to determine the rights acquired by the 
United States by its conquest of Mexican territory); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 
(16 Pet.) 367, 427 (1842) (discussing Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 
543 (1823)); McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 581 (“[T]itle was respected until 
the revolution, when it was forfeited by the laws of war.”). 
 54. Cf. United States v. Reading, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 1, 10 (1855) (“War has 
its incidents and rights for persons and for nations, unlike any that can occur 
in a time of peace . . . .”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 225 (1871) (“[L]aws of 
war . . . exempt[ ] one engaged in war for certain acts done in the prosecution 
thereof  [because] international law is a law of the United States, of the nation, 
and not of the several States.”). 
 57. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 77 
(1804) (“So far as Congress have thought proper to legislate us into a state of 
war, the law of nations in war is to apply.”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 
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made clear that the law of war was not judicially enforceable, 
i.e., that redress for a violation could be sought only in a bellig-
erent’s political capacity and not by an individual through the 
courts.58 It is worth highlighting that this question of judicial 
enforceability remains unanswered as to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions.59 The Court has yet to decide whether the conven-
tions are self-executing.60 
What, then, of “humanitarian” law? As noted above, the 
Court has implicitly referred to humanitarian law principles 
long before the Lieber Code. In the familiar context of custom-
ary rules pertaining to the use of force at sea, Justice Johnson 
alluded to the early development of humanitarian law: “The 
good sense of mankind has lessened [the] horrors [of war] on 
land, and it is scarcely possible to find any sufficient reason 
why an analogous reformation should not take place upon the 
ocean.”61 Fifteen years later, in contemplating an exception to 
the doctrine that citizens of hostile states cannot enter into 
 
Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (“It is not denied . . . that congress may authorize general 
hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or par-
tial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to 
our situation, must be noticed.”). Indeed, prior to the 1949 Conventions, the 
law of war became applicable as a function of the existence of a “state of war.” 
See Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2, 
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter Second Hague Conven-
tion] (noting that regulations were applicable “in case of war”); see also INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE 
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 19–21 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) 
[hereinafter Pictet, POW COMMENTARY] (noting states’ manipulation of 
whether a state of war exists and suggesting that the 1949 conventions at-
tempted to “find a remedy to this state of affairs”). 
 58. See Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 60 (1877) (noting that if a bel-
ligerent “offends against the accepted laws of nations, he must answer in his 
political capacity to other nations[,] . . . . [o]ther nations may join his enemy, 
and enter the conflict against him . . . . [, and] an aggrieved enemy must look 
alone for his indemnity to the terms upon which he agrees to close the conflict”); 
see also The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572 (1874) (likening the effect 
of maritime law to “international law or the laws of war, which have the effect 
of law in no country any further than they are accepted and received as such”). 
 59. See Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1002 (2010) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). In FTC v. A.P.W. Paper, the Court elided a full airing of whether the 
1929 Convention was self-executing, 328 U.S. 193, 203 (1946),but soon there-
after stated that the obvious scheme of the Convention was to entrust the po-
litical branches with enforcement responsibility. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 
U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950) (holding that the “obvious scheme of the agreement” 
is for enforcement to be on “political and military authorities”). 
 60. See Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1002 (showing that the question of whether 
the “Geneva Conventions are self-executing” is still outstanding). 
 61. The Atlanta, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 409, 429 (1818) (Johnson, J., 
concurring). 
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binding contracts, Justice Johnson remarked that the “general 
rule in international law, that the severities of war are to be 
diminished by all safe and practical means” may in fact mili-
tate in favor of such an exception.62 Similarly vague, yet unmis-
takable references to humanitarian principles as embodied in 
the law of war, while not commonplace, dot the landscape of the 
Court’s references to the law of war.63 
In Luther v. Borden, predating the Lieber Code by fourteen 
years, the Court first alluded more explicitly to the substance of 
humanitarian law.64 Enrolled in the state infantry during the 
Dorr Rebellion, a citizens’ insurrection mounted to overthrow 
the New Hampshire state government, Borden broke into 
Luther’s house to search the premises and arrest Luther, who 
was suspected of aiding and abetting the insurrection.65 Upon 
Luther’s action for trespass, the Court opined, “[w]hen bellig-
erent measures do become authorized by extreme resistance, 
and a legitimate state of war exists, and civil authority is pros-
trate, and violence and bloodshed seem the last desperate 
resort, yet war measures must be kept within certain restraints 
in all civil contests in all civilized communities.”66 
The Court quoted Swiss philosopher Emerich de Vattel for 
the proposition that “‘[t]he common laws of war, those maxims 
of humanity, moderation, and honor,’ which should character-
ize other wars . . . ‘ought to be observed by both parties in every 
civil war.’”67 Pointing out that martial force can only be exer-
 
 62. Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 586, 593 (1833). The 
Court, however, ultimately declined to recognize such an exception on the 
facts before it. See id. (“[I]t may be safely affirmed that there is no such recog-
nized exception.”). 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17, 367 (1862) 
(“The doctrine here maintained, that in war, poison and every species of fraud 
may rightfully be used, has received the general condemnati[o]n of mankind.”); 
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125, 128 (1814) (discussing con-
fiscation of property during war and making several references to humanity). 
 64. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 85 (1849) (referring to humanity 
as a common law of war). Luther is best known for its pronouncements about 
the legality of martial law and the nonjusticiability of the Guarantee Clause. 
See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension Power, 
and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391, 424–30 (2007). 
 65. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 2. For a historical account of the rebellion, 
see generally GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON 
TRIAL, 1831–1861 (1976). 
 66. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 85. 
 67. Id. (citation omitted). This language from Vattel is also cited in Wil-
liams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 191 (1877), and The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 
635, 667 (1862). For a discussion of Vattel’s influence on the Court’s early juris-
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cised to the extent strictly necessary under the circumstances,68 
the Court took care to distinguish between combatants and 
noncombatants, stating that the punishment of noncombatants 
belongs to the “municipal tribunals, and not to the sword and 
bayonet of the military.”69  
While the Court ultimately recognized New Hampshire’s 
right to put down the rebellion by force and affirmed the judg-
ment in favor of respondent Borden, it dismissed and remanded 
as to Luther’s mother, also a plaintiff.70 Pointing to Mrs. Luth-
er’s status as a noncombatant, the Court noted that the lower 
courts had not tried “whether any of the rights of war, or rights 
of a citizen in civil strife . . . have here . . . been violated.”71 As 
such, Borden should have been afforded the opportunity to, “as 
by the general rights of war,” justify his conduct.72 In light of 
Mrs. Luther’s status as “a female . . . not at all subject to mili-
tary duty and laws, and . . . not in arms as an opponent,” how-
ever, Borden’s prospects on remand were “very doubtful.”73 
In several cases during the Civil War and Reconstruction 
era, the Court further drew on the customary humanitarian 
law of war. The Court both offered general observations about 
the nature of the law and elucidated specific propositions.74 Its 
observations during this period offer a rough outline of several 
provisions that later would be codified at the Hague and in Ge-
neva. Nearly three decades after Luther, for example, the Court 
again relied on Vattel for the proposition that the “common 
laws of war” are equally applicable to civil war.75 A variation of 
 
prudence, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: 
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 9, 192 n.20 (1996). 
 68. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 86 (“[R]ule of force and violence operate 
only to a due extent and for a due time, within its appropriate sphere . . . .”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 88. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 87–88. 
 74. See Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 613 (1878) (“[L]aws of war as estab-
lished among nations have their foundation in reason, and tend to mitigate 
the cruelties and miseries which such conflicts produce.” (citing The Prize 
Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 669 (1862))). 
 75. See Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 191 (1877) (“[I]n a civil war the 
contending parties have a right to claim the enforcement of the same rules 
which govern the conduct of armies in wars between independent nations—
rules intended to mitigate the cruelties which would attend mutual reprisals 
and retaliations.”). The Court made this point even more explicitly a year lat-
er. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 (1878) (“Though the [Civil 
War] was not between independent nations, but between different portions of 
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this proposition was codified in Common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, which provides baseline protections ap-
plicable to conflicts “not of an international character.”76 This 
language has traditionally been understood to refer to civil 
wars, though as described below the Supreme Court has since 
flexed its interpretive muscle to move beyond that view. 
Similarly, in the context of territorial conquest, the Court 
observed that “the rights of war . . . are mitigated by the laws of 
war . . . with respect to the effects of conquest, as well as to the 
mode of warfare.”77 This observation can be viewed as foreshad-
owing the development of the two distinct branches of humani-
tarian law: Geneva law and Hague law. The former is con-
cerned with the treatment of persons following conquest, 
during or after war; the latter is concerned with controlling the 
means and methods of warfare.78 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s early treatment of the “laws of war” suggests 
several observations. As a preliminary matter, the term “hu-
manitarian law” is useful from the viewpoints of taxonomy and 
analysis. Because the Court’s early references to the “humani-
tarian” law of war are intertwined with law of war references to 
distinct, but related, concepts in international law, the use of 
the term “humanitarian” is warranted as a practical matter. 
While the Court frequently refers to the law of war, more-
over, it uses the term in a humanitarian sense in only a frac-
tion of these instances. Most such references refer to the cus-
tomary laws governing the conduct of war on the high seas or 
relating to the effect of war on commercial relations.79 Nonethe-
less, along with several vague references, the Court made at 
least one explicit reference to humanitarian law principles even 
before Francis Lieber’s first modern codification of the humani-
 
the same nation, yet having taken the proportions of a territorial war, the in-
surgents having become formidable enough to be recognized as belligerents, 
the same doctrine must be held to apply.”). 
 76. E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]. 
 77. United States v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17, 368 (1862). But see 
Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 60 (1877) (“As a rule, whatever is neces-
sary to [lessen the strength of an adversary] is law-ful [sic]; and, as between 
the belligerents, each determines for himself what is necessary.”). 
 78. See infra notes 89, 182–83 and accompanying text. 
 79. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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tarian jus in bello. In Luther v. Borden, the Court hinted at the 
principle of distinction between combatants and noncomba-
tants.80 That this reference appears in the context of a domestic 
uprising reinforces what the Court twice affirmed during the 
Civil War and Reconstruction period: certain humanitarian law 
principles apply equally during civil wars.81 Still, it is critical to 
distinguish these appeals to the “common law of war” from lat-
er references to positive humanitarian law. Before the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, internal armed conflicts were governed 
exclusively by domestic law.82 
Furthermore, as the above discussion of Luther suggests, 
the Court offers some pronouncements on the substantive pro-
visions of customary humanitarian law, or the “common law of 
war.”83 And finally, the Court’s early references to the law of 
war foreshadow a theme that runs throughout its humanitar-
ian law jurisprudence: the Court’s willingness to invoke the law 
of war is circumscribed by its deference to the political 
branches during wartime. 
II.  HAGUE LAW   
The 1899 meeting of twenty-six states in the Hague gave 
birth to Conventions and Declarations that remain part of the 
law of war known generally as Hague law.84 A 1907 Conference 
adopted ten other Conventions relating to warfare;85 most sig-
nificant for this analysis are the Convention Relative to the 
 
 80. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. See generally 1 JEAN-
MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUIS DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3–8 (2005) [here-
inafter ICRC, CIHL] (describing the principle of distinction). 
 81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 82. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 18–20 
(2002) (discussing the various stages of armed conflict and stating that “[t]he 
laws of war were not automatically applicable to internal armed conflicts in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”); Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, 
supra note 57, at 28 (“Up to 1949, the Geneva Conventions were designed to 
assist only the victims of wars between States.”). 
 83. See supra notes 64–73. 
 84. The Declarations banned the launching of projectiles and explosives 
from balloons. They did not garner universal support, but are now generally 
accepted as expressing customary law, which the U.S. Army Field Manual on 
the Law of Land Warfare recognizes as “‘binding on all nations.’” GREEN, su-
pra note 17, at 31 (quoting DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE ¶ 7(c) (1956)). Notably, the 1899 conference also produced the Con-
vention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land. See Second 
Hague Convention, supra note 57. 
 85. GREEN, supra note 17, at 32. 
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Laws and Customs of War on Land,86 the Convention Relative 
to the Opening of Hostilities,87 and the Convention Relative to 
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War 
on Land.88 In general terms, the Hague Conventions and Dec-
larations contain rules relating to the means and methods of 
warfare, i.e., to tactical conduct and weapons of war.89 The Su-
preme Court has cited Hague law in sixteen cases:90 invoking 
the Conventions for reasons of definition, as indicia of U.S. gov-
ernment policy, as aids in interpreting statutes, and as a 
means to consider directly alleged breaches of the Conventions. 
The first such reference appears in 1913,91 just one year before 
a scheduled third Hague conference that never took place in the 
wake of World War I’s outbreak.92  
A. SEEKING DEFINITION: SETTING THE PARAMETERS OF 
RELIANCE ON HUMANITARIAN LAW 
The Court’s early reliance on Hague law can be seen as 
framing its approach to humanitarian law treaties in general. 
Broadly speaking, the Court has relied on Hague law for rea-
sons of definition or to seek interpretive guidance. In four cas-
es, the Court invoked Hague law to define particular con-
cepts.93 The most straightforward use of Hague law for 
definitional purposes occurs in MacLeod v. United States. In 
MacLeod, the Court invoked the Regulations annexed to the 
1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on 
 
 86. Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33. 
 87. Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2259, 1 Bevans 619 [hereinafter Third Hague Convention]. 
 88. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and 
Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654.  
 89. See, e.g., MCCOUBREY, supra note 20, at 28. 
 90. See supra note 6 for a listing of cases. The three cases that cite both 
Geneva and Hague law—Hamdan, Hamdi, and Yamashita—are discussed in 
infra Part III. 
 91. See Macleod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 425–26 (1913). 
 92. David Caron, War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the 
1899 Peace Conference, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 22 (2000). 
 93. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595–612 (2006) (discussing 
whether conspiracy is defined in the Conventions), superseded by statute, Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; In re Ya-
mashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1946) (discussing whether the convention imposes 
a duty on commanders to control their troops); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 
29–31 & n.7 (1942) (referencing the Hague Convention in the context of defin-
ing “persons to whom belligerent rights and duties attach”); MacLeod, 229 
U.S. at 425–26 (invoking the Convention to define occupation which “give[s] 
the right to exercise governmental authority”). 
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Land to define occupation giving rise to governmental rights.94 
But the Court’s reliance on Hague law for reasons of definition 
does not end there. In Ex parte Quirin, In re Yamashita, and 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court turned to Hague law to “de-
fine” the charges levied against petitioners, that is, to graft 
substance onto the bones of the charges in determining that 
they allege (or do not allege) a violation of the law of war.95 
Compelled by the law’s incorporation into domestic statute, this 
use of Hague law is the most common procedural avenue 
through which the Court provides thoughtful analysis of hu-
manitarian law. This section assesses the Court’s “definitional” 
approach in MacLeod and Quirin. 
Macleod demonstrates the Court’s reliance on Hague law 
for definition and its reluctance to do so without the sanction of 
the political branches.96 In MacLeod, the petitioner asked the 
Court to reverse a court of claims decision dismissing his peti-
tion seeking reimbursement from the United States for certain 
duties paid under protest upon a cargo of rice imported into the 
Philippine Islands three months before the 1898 outbreak of 
war with Spain.97 In determining the propriety of exercising 
the levy, the Court considered what constituted an “occupa-
tion,” which would then give rise to the legitimate exercise of 
governmental authority.98 To answer this question, it consulted 
the Second Hague Convention. The Court cited two articles de-
fining occupation and the duties of the occupant,99 and then 
 
 94. Macleod, 229 U.S. at 425–26. Notably, the Court emphasized an ex-
ecutive order approving the Convention notwithstanding that the United 
States had signed and ratified the Convention. Id. at 427. 
 95. See supra note 93. 
 96. For example, while the Convention defined occupation, the Court still 
looked to presidential “[m]essages and [p]apers” and “executive orders” for 
support. Macleod, 229 U.S. at 425–28. 
 97. Id. at 417–20. 
 98. Id. at 425. 
 99. Id. at 426 (“Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed 
under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation applies only to the 
territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert itself. 
. . . The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the 
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish 
and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” (quoting Second Hague 
Convention, supra note 57, arts. 42, 43)). In the more recent case of Madsen v. 
Kinsella, the Court quoted a parallel provision of the Annex to the Fourth Hague 
Convention in elaborating on the President’s “urgent and infinite responsibili-
ty” of governing territory occupied by U.S. forces. 343 U.S. 341, 348 & n.13 
(1952) (citing Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, Annex art. 43). 
  
1360 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1339 
 
noted that President McKinley was “sensible of and disposed to 
conform the activities of our Government to the principles of in-
ternational law and practice.”100 With Hague-based definition 
and executive approval in hand, the Court reversed, holding 
the payment made to the United States in the Philippines un-
lawful.101 
In the well-known case of Ex parte Quirin, the Court ap-
proved the use of military commissions to try eight German 
saboteurs.102 In so holding, it engaged in an extensive analysis 
of the law of war and appealed to the Fourth Hague Convention 
of 1907 to define petitioners’ conduct as unlawful belligeren-
cy.103 Quirin offers the paradigmatic example of the most fre-
quent procedural avenue through which the Court approaches 
humanitarian law and which tends to yield its most extensive 
analysis. Specifically, the Court analyzed humanitarian law to 
determine if the charged offense constituted a violation of the 
law of war so as to be triable by military commission.104  
After receiving training at a sabotage school near Berlin, 
the eight Quirin petitioners crossed the Atlantic in two German 
submarines and entered the United States under cover of 
darkness at beaches in New York and Florida.105 The petition-
ers were under instructions from the German High Command 
to destroy war facilities in the United States in exchange for 
salary payments from the German government, but were short-
ly captured by the FBI in New York and Chicago.106 By order of 
the President, petitioners were denied access to civilian courts 
and tried by military commission.107  
 
 100. Macleod, 229 U.S. at 426. The Court quoted an executive order stating 
that taxes and duties levied upon conquered populations “‘are to be used for 
the purpose of paying the expenses of government under the military occupa-
tion,’” and that such taxation “‘is to be exercised within such limitations that it 
may not savor of confiscation.’” Id. (quoting Exec. Order, in 10 MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 208, 210 (May 19, 1898)). 
 101. Id. at 435 (holding that the payment was “covered by neither the or-
ders of the President nor the ratifying acts of Congress”).  
 102. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942). See generally LOUIS FISHER, 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 91–129 (2005) (describing in depth the background of 
the case).  
 103. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29–31 & n.7. 
 104. See id. at 34–38. 
 105. Id. at 20–21.  
 106. Id. at 21–22.  
 107. Id. at 22–23. 
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The petitioners were charged, inter alia, with “violation of 
the law of war.”108 Because the Court determined that Article 
15 of the Articles of War constituted congressional authoriza-
tion for trial of offenses against the law of war, it faced the 
question of “whether it is within the constitutional power of the 
National Government to place petitioners upon trial before a 
military commission for the offenses with which they are 
charged.”109 Answering this question compelled the Court to 
consider “whether any of the acts charged is an offense against 
the law of war cognizable before a military tribunal.”110 Not all 
law-of-war violations are triable by military commission—
either because U.S. courts do not recognize them as violations 
or because the Constitution mandates trial by jury. The Court 
thus framed the inquiry as follows: (1) Is the charged offense a 
violation of the law of war, and if so, (2) does the Constitution 
prohibit trial by military commission? This Article, of course, is 
concerned with the former question.111 
Accordingly, the Quirin Court surveyed the law of war to 
determine if the charge indeed constituted a violation so as to 
be cognizable by military commission.112 In performing this 
analysis, the Court elucidated several core humanitarian law 
principles. First, the Court recognized two foundational distinc-
tions: between (1) “the armed forces and the peaceful popula-
tions of belligerent nations,” and (2) “those who are lawful and 
unlawful combatants.”113  
For the former, the Court cited Article I of the Annex to the 
Fourth Hague Convention, which “defines the persons to whom 
belligerent rights and duties attach,” as well as a manual of 
military law from the British War Office, the official law of war 
 
 108. Id. at 23. Specification one of the first charge stated: 
[Petitioners] being enemies of the United States and acting for the 
German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation, secretly and covertly 
passed, in civilian dress, contrary to the law of war, through the mili-
tary and naval lines and defenses of the United States and went behind 
such lines, contrary to the law of war, in civilian dress for the purpose 
of committing hostile acts, and, in particular, to destroy certain war 
industries, war utilities and war materials within the United States. 
Id. at 36. 
 109. Id. at 29. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. This inquiry into the charged offenses was necessary because Con-
gress incorporated by reference all offenses against the law of war recognized 
as such by that body of law. Id. at 30. 
 112. See id. at 29–36. 
 113. Id. at 30–31. 
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volume of the German General Staff, and a number of other in-
ternational law treatises.114 That petitioners removed their ar-
my uniforms in an effort to disguise their military identities, 
thus violating this principle, was crucial to the Court’s holding 
that they were subject to trial by military tribunal.115  
As to the second distinction—between lawful and unlawful 
combatants—the Court observed that while each category of 
persons is subject to capture and detention, unlawful combat-
ants are also subject “to trial and punishment by military tri-
bunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.”116 
The term “unlawful combatants” is variously defined as 
“[s]couts or single soldiers, if disguised,” “[a] messenger or 
agent who attempts to steal through the territory occupied by 
the enemy,” and “[a]rmed prowlers, by whatever names they 
may be called.”117 For this proposition the Court again cited the 
British War Manual as well as several treatises.118 It also 
pointed to U.S. practice and quoted at length various provisions 
of the Lieber Code and the War Department’s Rules of Land 
Warfare in concluding that unlawful combatants are “not en-
titled” to the privileges of a prisoner of war.119  
Hague law played a critical role in the Court’s analysis. 
The Court reasoned that because the government saw fit to de-
fine lawful combatants,120 it therefore impliedly recognized the 
existence of the corollary category—unlawful combatants. In 
other words, the Court’s reliance on and adoption of the Hague 
Convention’s definition of lawful belligerent—armies, militia, 
and volunteer forces under the command of a “person responsi-
ble for his subordinates,” bearing a “fixed distinctive emblem 
recognizable at a distance,” carrying arms openly, and acting in 
accordance with the law of war121—served as the launching 
 
 114. Id. at 30 n.7. 
 115. See id. at 31 (holding that “sp[ies] who secretly and without uniform 
pass the military lines” are “offenders against the law of war subject to trial 
. . . by military tribunals”); William H. Ferrell, III, No Shirt, No Shoes, No Sta-
tus: Uniforms, Distinction, and Special Operations in International Armed 
Conflict, 178 MIL. L. REV. 94, 128 (2003). 
 116. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. 
 117. Id. at 32–33, 33 n.11 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 118. Id. at 31 n.8. 
 119. Id. at 34–36.  
 120. The definition of lawful belligerent adopted by the War Department’s 
Manual was taken from Article 1 of the Annex to the Fourth Hague Conven-
tion. Id. at 34. 
 121. Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, Annex, art. 1; see also Quir-
in, 317 U.S. at 37–38 (“Citizens who associate themselves with the military 
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point for its explicit inference of the corollary category: unlaw-
ful belligerents. The Court found the principle that unlawful 
combatants exist as a separate category both not entitled to 
prisoner of war privileges and triable by military tribunal to be 
so universally recognized and accepted that “we think it must 
be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war recognized 
by this Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of 
War.”122 The Court thus held that the charge against petition-
ers “plainly alleges [a] violation of the law of war,” for which 
Congress had authorized trial by military commission.123 
Quirin’s treatment of humanitarian law is critical for at 
least two reasons. First, the Bush Administration relied heavily 
on Quirin to justify its detention of suspected terrorists as 
“enemy combatants.”124 Second, as noted above, the Court’s en-
gagement with the law of war to determine whether the 
charged offense constituted a violation of the law of war so as to 
be triable by military commission represents the first instance 
of the most common procedural avenue through which the Su-
preme Court has engaged humanitarian law.125 
 
arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter 
this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of 
the Hague Convention and the law of war.”). While the Court quotes the War 
Department’s Rules of Land Warfare, it takes care to point out that its defini-
tion of lawful belligerent was lifted from the Hague Convention. Id. at 34. The 
Court does not make clear a hierarchy of authorities, though it does note that 
the United States had signed and ratified the 1907 Convention. Id. 
 122. Id. at 35–36 (noting the principle’s acceptance “in practice both here 
and abroad” and “as valid by authorities on international law”). 
 123. Id. at 36. 
 124. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A YEAR OF LOSS: 
REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 32 n.169 (2002) (noting 
the Bush Administration’s reliance on Quirin). For a critical appraisal of the 
Bush Administration’s reliance on Quirin, see Jonathan Hafetz, Stretching 
Precedent Beyond Recognition: The Misplaced Reliance on World War II Cases 
in the War on Terror, 28 REV. LITIG. 365, 367–76 (2008). 
 125. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which displaced the 
Articles of War when it came into effect in 1951, includes a similar jurisdic-
tional hook: 
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-
martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other 
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders 
or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by mili-
tary commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. 
10 U.S.C. § 821, art. 21 (2006). 
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B. HAGUE LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF NAVAL WAR 
The Court drew on Hague law relating to naval war in two 
cases arising in the context of World War I.126 In one instance, 
the Court found Hague law to embody the position of the U.S. 
government on the content of customary international law. In 
the other instance, the Court rejected the applicability of a dif-
ferent (unsigned) treaty in the face of a contrary congressional 
dictate. The use of Hague law in this context—though admit-
tedly outside the narrow definition of quintessentially “human-
itarian” law—further demonstrates the Court’s pragmatic use 
of humanitarian law treaties. 
Exactly one month before the United States abandoned its 
long-standing policy of neutrality to enter what would later be 
known as World War I, the Supreme Court decided a case that 
tested U.S. neutrality.127 In Berg v. British & African Steam 
Navigation Co., a German cruiser captured a British steamship 
on the high seas.128 Instead of proceeding to a German port or 
the nearest accessible neutral port, the Germans guided the 
vessel nearly 3000 miles to the U.S. port in Hampton Roads, 
Virginia.129 The German Ambassador then notified the U.S. 
State Department that Germany intended to keep the ship in 
port for an unspecified period of time, and requested that the 
British crew be detained in the United States for the duration 
of the war.130 The vessel’s owner soon filed suit in U.S. court to 
recover the ship, and the Supreme Court was eventually tasked 
with deciding whether this use of a U.S. port constituted “a 
breach of [U.S.] neutrality under the principles of international 
law.”131 The Court answered in the affirmative.132 
In describing the U.S. policy of neutrality, the Court drew 
on several provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention Concern-
ing the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War.133 
These provisions laid out the limited circumstances under 
which a prize may dock in a neutral port, and required the neu-
 
 126. Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215 (1926); Berg v. British 
& African Steam Navigation Co., 243 U.S. 124 (1917). 
 127. Berg, 243 U.S. at 150. 
 128. Id. at 143–44. 
 129. Id. at 145.  
 130. Id. at 146. The prisoners were instead released. Id.  
 131. Id. at 146–47. 
 132. Id. at 153. 
 133. Id. at 150–52 (citing Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of 
Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 1 Bevans 723 [here-
inafter Thirteenth Hague Convention]).  
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tral power to release a prize brought into its ports under any 
other circumstance.134 Importantly, the United States had en-
tered a reservation to a provision of the Convention that would 
have allowed states to harbor prizes of war pending adjudica-
tion by a prize court.135 The Court noted that the treaty was not 
binding for lack of ratification, but nonetheless went on to find 
it “very persuasive as showing the attitude of the American 
Government when the question is one of international law.”136  
After the U.S. declaration of war against Germany on April 
6, 1917, the Court again referenced Hague law—if only 
promptly and unsurprisingly to reject it.137 Littlejohn & Co. v. 
United States began as a damages case arising from the colli-
sion of two steamships in New York Harbor.138 After the colli-
sion, the question became one of ownership.139 Pursuant to a 
Joint Resolution of Congress following the U.S. declaration of 
war against Germany, the United States purportedly took pos-
session and title of one of the ill-fated ships—a German mer-
chant ship docked in a U.S. port—and refitted it as an army 
transport.140 If the United States indeed owned the vessel at 
the time of collision, precedent commanded dismissal of the 
damages claim against the United States.141 
The Court rejected arguments rooted in provisions of the 
Hague Convention Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant 
Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities which afforded merchant 
ships belonging to a belligerent the opportunity to depart the 
hostile port at the commencement of hostilities.142 This rejec-
tion is hardly surprising because the United States had not 
 
 134. Thirteenth Hague Convention, supra note 133, arts. 21–23; see also 
Berg, 243 U.S. at 150. 
 135. M. DELTENRE, RECUEIL GENERAL LOIS ET COUTUMES DE LA GUERRE 
413 (1943); THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, 
at 219 (James Brown Scott ed., 1915). 
 136. Berg, 243 U.S. at 151. In fact, the United States acceded to the treaty 
on December 3, 1909. See DELTENRE, supra note 135, at 415; THE HAGUE 
CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, supra note 135, at 217; 
see also Manley O. Hudson, Present Status of the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907, 25 AM J. INT’L L. 114, 115–16 (1931) (noting further that the Con-
vention was accepted by the United States prior to August 1914). 
 137. Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215, 226 (1926). 
 138. Id. at 218. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 224 (citing The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922)). 
 142. Convention Relating to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the 
Outbreak of Hostilities arts. 1, 2, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 127, 129 
(Supp. 1908). 
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signed the treaty, and because Congress had directly spoken to 
the issue. Noting that “[t]he United States did not approve that 
Convention,” the Court concluded: “In the absence of conven-
tion every government may pursue what policy it thinks best 
concerning seizure and confiscation of enemy ships in its har-
bors when war occurs.”143 Although these cases reveal little of 
substance about humanitarian law, they further illustrate the 
Court’s flexible and pragmatic approach to humanitarian law 
treaties. 
C. ASSESSING ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HAGUE LAW: 
INSTITUTIONAL RELUCTANCE 
Three cases presented the Court with the opportunity to 
address alleged violations of the Hague Conventions. In all 
three cases, the Court declined to do so. Yet notwithstanding 
this reluctance to consider explicitly claims allegedly arising 
under Hague law, the Court drew several conclusions as to the 
substance of the Conventions. 
In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., the Court responded to an 
action in replevin to recover a consignment of hides allegedly 
conveyed in violation of the Fourth Hague Convention.144 The 
case arose from events of the Mexican Revolution, the relevant 
facts of which follow. After the assassination of President Fran-
cisco Madero, General Victoriano Huerta declared himself Pres-
ident of the Republic.145 A month later, the governor of Coahui-
la, Venustiano Carranza, initiated a revolution against the 
Huerta government.146 After capturing the Cuahuila town of 
Torreon, where the original owner of the goods at issue did 
business, Francisco Villa—a powerful revolutionary general 
opposed to the Huerta government—levied a tax on its inhabi-
tants.147 Loyal to the ill-fated Huerta government, the owner 
fled Torreon upon its capture and General Villa’s forces seized 
the hides to satisfy the military tax.148 The plaintiff claimed 
title as the assignee of the original owner, while the defendant 
claimed to own the hides through purchase from a Texas corpo-
ration that allegedly acquired them from General Villa.149  
 
 143. Littlejohn & Co., 270 U.S. at 226. 
 144. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 299, 301 (1918). 
 145. Id. at 299. 
 146. Id. at 300. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 299. 
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Petitioner claimed that because the property was taken in 
violation of Article 46 of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth 
Hague Convention, which provided that “private property can-
not be confiscated,” no title to the goods passed to the Texas 
corporation and thus to respondent.150 The Court declined to 
consider the validity of the tax levied by General Villa and thus 
decided the case on a mix of act of state and political question 
grounds.151 It pointed out, however, that the language relied 
upon by petitioner “does not have the scope claimed for it” in 
view of other provisions of the Regulations, which recognized 
the right of the occupying power to levy “money contributions” 
under certain circumstances.152 The Court also made the pre-
liminary observation that “[i]t would, perhaps, be sufficient an-
swer to this contention to say that the Hague Conventions are 
international in character, designed and adapted to regulate in-
ternational warfare, and that they do not, in terms or in pur-
pose, apply to a civil war.”153 Therefore, although the Court 
concluded that it could not pass on the validity of the Hague 
Convention claim because General Villa was acting as an agent 
of the “legitimate” Mexican government,154 it nonetheless en-
gaged the Hague Convention to demonstrate that petitioner’s 
claim would likely fail on its own terms.155  
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,156 the standard 
citation case for the act of state doctrine, the Court speculated 
further about the expropriation at issue in Oetjen and elabo-
rated on its statement in dicta that the Hague Convention did 
not prohibit it.157 The Sabbatino Court observed that the ex-
propriation by the then-rebel government would not violate in-
 
 150. Id. at 301 (citing Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33). 
 151. Id. at 302 (“The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is 
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—
departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the 
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”). 
 152. Id. at 301 (quoting Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, arts. 46, 49).  
 153. Id. 
 154. The United States had since recognized the Carranza government:  
[W]hen a government which originates in revolution or revolt is rec-
ognized by the political department of our government as the de jure 
government of the country in which it is established, such recognition 
is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct of the 
government so recognized from the commencement of its existence. 
Id. at 302–03. 
 155. See id. at 303–04. 
 156. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 157. Id. at 417. 
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ternational law even as applied to non-Mexicans.158 Discussing 
the contemporaneous case of Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,159 
in which the Court passed on a similar seizure of property dur-
ing the Mexican revolution, the Sabbatino Court stated of the 
seizure: the “declaration of legality in the Hague Convention, 
and the international rules of war on seizures, rendered the al-
legation of an international law violation in Ricaud sufficiently 
frivolous so that consideration on the merits was unneces-
sary.”160 The Court thus expressed a clear view that the Fourth 
Hague Convention of 1907 and customary international law 
permitted governmental seizure of property during war in cer-
tain circumstances.161 In this way, the Court interpreted the 
substance of the Fourth Hague Convention notwithstanding its 
reluctance to address individual claims that allegedly arose 
under it. 
In a World War II-era case, the Court again declined to 
consider a claim allegedly arising under the Fourth Hague 
Convention. In a petition for writ of mandamus, Kumezo Kawa-
to asked the Court to allow his suit for unpaid wages and other 
compensation to proceed against the owner of a vessel on which 
he worked.162 The owners of the ship moved to abate the action 
on the ground that Kawato had become an enemy alien follow-
ing the U.S. declaration of war against Japan, and hence had 
“no right to prosecute any action in any court of the United 
States during the pendency of said war.”163 Kawato argued that 
Article 23(h) of the Fourth Hague Convention Regulations al-
lowed him to proceed.164 The Court declined to consider Kawa-
to’s rights under “[a]pplicable treaties,” and dispensed with his 
Hague Convention argument in a footnote.165 Noting that the 
question had never before been raised in the United States, the 
Court pointed out that the clause was added to a predecessor 
convention “without substantial discussion” and cited an Eng-
 
 158. Id. at 443 n.2. 
 159. 246 U.S. 304 (1918). 
 160. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 444 n.2. 
 161. Id. at 416–19. 
 162. Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 70 (1942). 
 163. Id. at 70–71 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 164. Article 23(h) provides: “It is especially prohibited . . . to declare abol-
ished, suspended, or inadmissible in a Court of law the rights and action of the 
nationals of the hostile party.” Id. at 72 n.1 (citing Fourth Hague Convention, 
supra note 33). 
 165. Id. at 72 & n.1 (“Applicable treaties are ambiguous and should not be 
interpreted without more care than is necessary in this case.”).  
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lish case that interpreted the provision to apply “solely in ene-
my areas occupied by a belligerent,” an interpretation that was 
“repeated with approval” in an address by a member of the 
House.166  
Hague law again arose in the more recent sovereign im-
munity case of Austria v. Altmann. In Altmann, the Supreme 
Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 
and hence the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, applied 
retroactively, allowing Altmann to bring her claim to recover 
paintings taken by the Nazis during the German occupation of 
Austria.167 Altmann claimed that Austria’s acquisition of the 
paintings violated either customary international law or Article 
56 of the Fourth Hague Convention168 and hence fell within the 
FSIA’s expropriation exemption—depriving Austria of sover-
eign immunity “in any case” where it “is engaged in a commer-
cial activity in the United States” and the case is one “in which 
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in 
issue.”169 Only Justice Breyer, in a separate concurrence, spe-
cifically noted that the alleged violation of international law in 
question was the violation of the Hague provision or customary 
international law.170 The Court emphasized the narrowness of 
its holding and expressly disclaimed reviewing the lower court’s 
pronouncement that the seizure was in violation of interna-
tional law.171 While the majority’s decision as to retroactivity of 
the FSIA cannot be read as a substantive pronouncement on 
the content of the Hague provision, the Court’s reticence to ad-
dress the alleged violation of the treaty is in line with its ap-
proach in Oetjen and Ex parte Kawato. 
In sum, the picture that emerges from the Court’s treat-
ment of claims allegedly arising under Hague law is one of re-
serve. The Court is reluctant to find a violation of the Hague 
Conventions, or to decide what rights they may confer upon pe-
 
 166. Id. at 72 n.1. 
 167. Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004). 
 168. Id. at 707 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Fourth Hague Convention, 
supra note 33, art. 56 (“All seizure of . . . works of art . . . is forbidden, and 
should be made the subject of legal proceedings.”). 
 169. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 706 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006)). 
 170. Id. at 707. 
 171. Id. at 700. The Ninth Circuit held that the seizure “explicitly violated 
both Austria’s and Germany’s obligations under the Hague Convention,” and 
pointed to “[a] number of the treaty’s accompanying regulations [that] are di-
rectly on point,” namely articles 46, 47, and 56. Altmann v. Republic of Aus-
tria, 317 F.3d 954, 965 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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titioners. Nonetheless, the Court does not always reject Hague 
arguments out of hand; even when abstaining, the Court offers 
varying levels of analysis of the provisions at issue. On one end 
of the spectrum, the Court went out of its way in Oetjen to point 
out that petitioner’s reading of the Convention cannot with-
stand scrutiny.172 In a later case, the Court elaborated on this 
point, making plain its view that Hague law does not categori-
cally prohibit government seizure of property in war.173 In the 
middle of the spectrum, the Kawato court referenced the draft-
ing history of the 1899 Convention, but ultimately discounted 
petitioner’s argument, providing no independent analysis and 
drawing no independent conclusions. On the other end of the 
spectrum, in Altmann, the Court altogether declined to address 
the alleged violation of the Hague Convention.174 Apart from a 
baseline reticence to address alleged violations, therefore, the 
Court’s approach is not amenable to simple categorization. 
D. HAGUE LAW OUTSIDE OF ARMED CONFLICT: ISOLATED AND 
BRIEF 
The Court has cited Hague law outside the context of 
armed conflict for a variety of propositions tangential to the 
outcomes of the cases. Such references suggest little more than 
that the Court is willing to resort to Hague law as persuasive 
authority as to non-dispositive matters. 
At least one member of the Court has invoked Hague law 
outside of armed conflict in four cases. In a case involving a 
Federal Tort Claims Act suit against the United States, the 
Court cited the Second Hague Convention in referencing U.S. 
obligations as an occupying power following World War II.175 In 
a First Amendment case, discussing the tension between the 
religion clauses, Justice Brennan juxtaposed the apparently 
one-dimensional mandate of Article XVIII of the 1899 Hague 
Regulations176 with the “difficult problems in connection with 
 
 172. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 301–02 (1918). 
 173. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416–17 (1964). 
 174. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700. 
 175. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 19 n.2 (1953) (citing Second 
Hague Convention, supra note 57). 
 176. “Prisoners of war shall enjoy every latitude in the exercise of their re-
ligion, including attendance at their own church services, provided only they 
comply with the regulations for order and police issued by the military author-
ities.” Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 297 n.72 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (citing Second Hague Convention, supra note 57). Justice 
Brennan took the quote from AMERICAN STATE PAPERS AND RELATED 
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chaplains and religious exercises in prisons” that have arisen in 
U.S. courts.177 In a case involving the standards governing the 
preparation and review of reports by commissions appointed to 
determine just compensation in eminent domain proceedings, 
the Court cited the 1907 Hague Convention Relative to the 
Creation of an International Prize Court for the proposition 
that an arbitration award “must give the reasons on which it is 
based.”178 
In a Cold War-era immigration case, Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, the Court—faced with the question of whether 
the government may constitutionally deport a resident alien for 
membership in the Communist Party—observed that a resident 
alien derives rights from both U.S. and international law, and 
is hence subject to a different set of obligations vis-à-vis the 
government than are citizens.179 The Court cited the Fourth 
Hague Convention for one such difference: that the government 
cannot compel aliens “to take part in the operations of war di-
rected against their own country.”180 The Court ultimately 
adopted a very deferential stance, concluding that the govern-
ment’s policy toward aliens is a political question in which the 
judiciary should not meddle: “Such matters are so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be 
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”181  
In none of these instances is the Court’s reliance on Hague 
law dispositive to the outcome of the case. In short, these cases 
demonstrate that the Court is willing to rely on Hague law as 
 
DOCUMENTS ON FREEDOM IN RELIGION 313 (William Addison Blakely ed., 4th 
rev. ed. 1949). 
 177. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 297 n.2. The Court thus ostensibly pointed to 
the Hague Convention as a document that does not have to navigate the diffi-
cult waters between “[e]stablishment” and “[f ]ree exercise.” Id. at 296. 
 178. United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199 n.4 (1964) (citing Thirteenth 
Hague Convention, supra note 133). Only after referencing Secretary of State 
Hughes’s characterization of the provision to President Harding did the Court 
go on to hold that the commissioners must state “not only the end result of 
their inquiry, but the process by which they reached it.” Id. at 199. 
 179. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585–87 (1952). 
 180. Id. at 586 (citing Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, art. 23). 
 181. Id. at 587–89 (stating that expulsion of an enemy alien is “a weapon of 
defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in 
every sovereign state . . . . It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward 
aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in 
regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance 
of a republican form of government”); see also id. at 596 (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (“It is not for this Court to reshape a world order based on politically 
sovereign States.”). 
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persuasive authority as to non-dispositive matters. Even in this 
context, when using Hague law as support, rather than illu-
stration, the Court has taken into account the views of the po-
litical branches. Not surprisingly, the Court’s reliance on 
Hague law in this context does not yield much in the way of in-
formative analysis.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The Supreme Court has referenced Hague law for a variety 
of reasons, both inside and outside the context of armed con-
flict. Several patterns emerge. First, the Court has invoked the 
Conventions for reasons of definition. This approach includes 
both seeking the definition of specific terms—legal occupancy 
in MacLeod—and seeking to define concepts embodied in the 
charges levied against detainees seeking their release, as in 
Quirin. Second, and relatedly, the Court uses Hague law as an 
aid in interpreting statutes. Again, Quirin is the paradigmatic 
example; there the Court relied on the Fourth Hague Conven-
tion’s definition of “lawful belligerent” to infer the existence of 
the corollary category and thus render defendants triable by 
military commission and outside the scope of certain IHL pro-
tections. Third, the Court references Hague law when asked to 
consider an alleged breach of the Conventions or to redress 
rights allegedly arising thereunder, tasks it has proven very re-
luctant to undertake. The Court’s treatment of Hague law is, 
unsurprisingly, pragmatic. The Court eschews lengthy disquisi-
tions about the corpus of humanitarian law in favor of more 
discrete reliance on particular provisions for definitional or in-
terpretive reasons. It is reluctant to assess alleged violations of 
Hague law and has dispensed with them where possible. Still, 
the Court has drawn on Hague law in a number of cases, and it 
has played a critical role in the disposition of several.  
III.  GENEVA LAW   
The Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949182 develop a 
system of protection for civilians, noncombatants, and those 
 
 182. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 
Fourth Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
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hors de combat—those “outside the fight,” including the sick, 
wounded, and detained.183 The 1949 Conventions are the most 
widely recognized and universally accepted codification of hu-
manitarian law.184 It is unsurprising and appropriate, then, 
that the Supreme Court offers its most extensive analysis of 
humanitarian law in the form of analysis of the Geneva Con-
ventions. This Part systematically reviews the Court’s treat-
ment of Geneva Law—from its first engagement with the 1929 
Convention in Yamashita and Johnson v. Eisentrager to its re-
cent reliance on the 1949 Conventions in the “war on terror” 
detainee cases.  
A. EARLY TREATMENT: YAMASHITA AND EISENTRAGER  
In the wake of World War II, the Court decided two cases 
best known for their implications for constitutional war powers. 
Yamashita and Eisentrager required the Court to engage hu-
manitarian law in several ways. First, the Court addressed al-
leged violations of the 1929 Geneva Convention. Second, as in 
Quirin, the Court probed humanitarian law to define the 
charges levied against petitioners to determine whether their 
trials by military commission were permissible under domestic 
law. This section reviews these issues in turn. 
1. Petitioners’ Geneva Claims 
The Court’s first reference to the Geneva Conventions in 
Yamashita offered detailed analysis of applicable provisions, 
but concluded that the Conventions did not apply.185 Four years 
later in Eisentrager, while affirming that the detainees in ques-
tion were “entitled” to the protections of the Convention, the 
Court relied on its earlier holding to render them inapplica-
ble.186 The Court’s early view of the applicability of the 1929 
 
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva 
Convention]; First Geneva Convention, supra note 76. 
 183. For a brief summary of the history and core provisions of the 1949 
Conventions, see Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, “Unlawful Combatants” 
or “Prisoners of War”: The Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
59, 62–73 (2003). 
 184. According to the ICRC, the Geneva Conventions have achieved uni-
versal acceptance, with 194 states parties. Press Release, Int’l Comm. of the 
Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 1949 Achieve Universal Acceptance (Aug. 
21, 2006), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/geneva 
-conventions-news-210806?OpenDocument&style=custo_print. 
 185. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 6, 20–24 (1946). 
 186. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790 (1950) (relying on Quirin 
and Yamashita without providing additional analysis). 
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Convention seems at first blush to contrast markedly with its 
reading of the 1949 Conventions in the “war on terror” context, 
namely Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Specifically, while Hamdan de-
clared Common Article 3 applicable to the armed conflict in 
Afghanistan, Yamashita and Eisentrager suggest that the 1929 
Convention is not judicially enforceable. This apparent discrep-
ancy can be explained in part by the inclusion in the 1949 Con-
ventions of enhanced individual rights provisions not present in 
the 1929 Convention.187 Fully understanding the Court’s more 
recent opinions, however, requires a review of these earlier pre-
cedents. In short, Yamashita sets the parameters of the Court’s 
engagement with the Geneva Conventions and the Eisentrager 
Court leans heavily on that decision. Eisentrager, in turn, is the 
key precedent at issue in Hamdan’s treatment of humanitarian 
law. 
The Court first referred to Geneva law in the infamous 
World War II-era case of Yamashita.188 The Commanding Gen-
eral of the Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands, Yamashita 
became a prisoner of war upon his surrender to U.S. forces on 
September 3, 1945.189 He was subsequently charged, tried, and 
convicted by military commission of violating the laws of 
war.190 Yamashita’s habeas petition charged that his detention 
for the purpose of trial was unlawful because the military 
commission lacked jurisdiction.191 Specifically, he argued that 
the military commission was not lawful because (1) it was 
created after the cessation of hostilities, (2) the procedure gov-
erning the trial violated domestic and international law, (3) the 
charge against him did not constitute a violation of the laws of 
war, and (4) the United States failed to notify the neutral pow-
er representing Japan, in violation of international law.192 The 
 
 187. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 146; Third Geneva 
Convention, supra note 182, arts. 85, 102; see also GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND 
LAW SINCE 1945, at 80–114 (1994). As explained below, the Hamdan Court 
emphasizes these differences between the 1929 and 1949 Conventions. 
 188. 327 U.S. at 6. Several pre-Yamashita detention cases in the World 
War II-era did not raise law of war issues because, for example, the detainee 
was held by civilian authorities, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297–98 (1944), 
or the case was briefed solely on constitutional war powers issues, Hirabaya-
shi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943). 
 189. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5. 
 190. Id. For a biographical portrait and information about Yamashita’s tri-
al, written by one of Yamashita’s lawyers, see generally A. FRANK REEL, THE 
CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA 17–175 (1949). 
 191. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5–6.  
 192. Id. at 6.  
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latter three rationales occasioned a discussion of humanitarian 
law by the Court.193 Indeed, two of Yamashita’s arguments cen-
tered on the Geneva Convention of 1929: that the admission of 
certain evidence violated Article 63, and that the failure to give 
advance notice of his trial to the neutral power representing 
Japan as a belligerent violated Article 60.194 
Four years later in Eisentrager, the Court considered the 
habeas petitions of twenty-one German nationals that had been 
tried and convicted by military commission for their involve-
ment in hostilities against the United States after Germany’s 
surrender.195 Like Yamashita, the German detainees claimed 
that their trial, conviction, and imprisonment violated Articles 
60 and 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929.196  
Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Convention provides: “Sen-
tence may be pronounced against a prisoner of war only by the 
same courts and according to the same procedure as in the case 
of persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining Pow-
er.”197 Yamashita argued that because he was a prisoner of 
war, and because the Articles of War applied to the trial of any 
person in the U.S. armed forces, Article 63 afforded him the 
protections of Articles 25 and 38 of the Articles of War—that 
depositions not be admitted into evidence in a capital case and 
that the tribunal apply the “rules of evidence generally recog-
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. Yamashita also argued that (1) the commission was not lawfully 
created, (2) the commission failed to charge him with a violation of the laws of 
war, and (3) he was deprived of a fair trial in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id.  
 195. Specifically, the detainees were charged with collecting and furnishing 
intelligence about the movement of American forces to the Japanese. Johnson 
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766, 785–86 (1950). The ultimate question in the 
case was whether civil courts could properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over 
aliens imprisoned abroad under sentences imposed by the executive through 
military tribunals. See id. A central point of contention between the majority 
and dissent, then, was the extent to which the Court could, and did, properly 
evaluate the petitions, as opposed to ruling on jurisdictional grounds. Compare 
id. at 791 (“[I]n the present application we find no basis for invoking federal 
judicial power in any district . . . .”), with id. at 797 (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“Though the scope of habeas corpus review of military tribunal sentences is 
narrow, I think it should not be denied to these petitioners and others like 
them.”). The Court ultimately decided that it could not exercise jurisdiction, 
and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. Id. at 790–91. 
 196. Id. The Eisentrager petitioners, like Yamashita, also claimed viola-
tions of the U.S. Constitution. Id.  
 197. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 63, July 
27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter 1929 Convention]. 
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nized in the trial of criminal cases in the district courts of the 
United States,” respectively.198  
The Court categorically rejected this argument, concluding 
that the Geneva Conventions did not compel application of the 
Articles of War and thus “imposed no restrictions upon the pro-
cedure to be followed.”199 To reach this conclusion, the Court 
contextualized Article 63 by placing it alongside the other two 
parts of Chapter 3 of the 1929 Convention, which it asserted, 
“taken together,” represented “a comprehensive description of 
the substantive offenses which prisoners of war may commit 
during their imprisonment, of the penalties which may be im-
posed on account of such offenses, and of the procedure by 
which guilt may be adjudged and pronounced.”200 The Court 
thus deemed it “clear” from this context that Article 63 applied 
only to proceedings against a prisoner of war “for offenses 
committed while a prisoner of war.”201 The Court rejected Ya-
mashita’s argument as to Article 60 of the Convention, also lo-
cated in Chapter 3, for the same reason.202 
In Eisentrager, the Court offered no further analysis of pe-
titioners’ Geneva claims, relying solely on its decisions in Ya-
mashita and Quirin.203 The Court, however, did make several 
further observations about the 1929 Convention. It pointed out 
that the prisoners did not claim, and that the Convention 
would not support, immunity from prosecution for war crimes; 
on the contrary, Article 75 of the Convention provided that de-
tention was authorized for prisoners of war throughout trial 
and, if necessary, until the end of the punishment.204 In a foot-
note, the Court affirmed that the prisoners were “entitled” to 
the substantive rights guaranteed by the 1929 Convention, but 
expressly disclaimed speaking to such rights.205 Rather, re-
sponsibility for observing and enforcing these rights was the 
 
 198. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20–21. 
 199. Id. at 20; see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 790 (noting further that “no 
prejudicial disparity is pointed out as between the Commission that tried pris-
oners and those that would try an offending soldier of the American forces of 
like rank”). 
 200. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 22–23. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 24. 
 203. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789–90 (“This claim the Court has twice con-
sidered and twice rejected, holding that such notice is required only of pro-
ceedings for disciplinary offenses committed during captivity and not in case of 
war crimes committed before capture.”). 
 204. Id. at 789. 
 205. Id. at 789 n.14. 
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province of the political and military authorities: the rights of 
enemy aliens could be vindicated “only through protests and in-
tervention of protecting powers.”206  
In Yamashita, Justices Murphy and Rutledge lodged vigor-
ous separate dissents.207 Justice Rutledge argued against the 
majority’s contextual reading of Articles 60 and 63 of the Gene-
va Convention,208 pointing out that it was undisputed that the 
Convention was binding upon the United States and further 
that the Convention had been followed during Yamashita’s in-
ternment.209 Justice Rutledge went out of his way to address 
the argument that the Convention’s applicability was in doubt 
because Japan had not ratified it,210 noting that “at the begin-
ning of the war both the United States and Japan announced 
their intention to adhere to [its] provisions” and citing Article 
82 and pertinent portions of the travaux preparatoires for the 
proposition that the Convention should be construed to mean 
that a state is “bound to apply [its] provisions to prisoners of 
war of nonparticipating states.”211 This construction, he argued, 
should be adopted for the “security” of captured members of 
U.S. armed forces, “if for no other[ reason].”212 In the alterna-
tive, Justice Rutledge urged that the treaty be viewed as strong 
 
 206. Id. In Hamdan, the government relied upon this footnote for its argu-
ment that the 1949 Convention was not judicially enforceable. See Brief for 
Respondents at 9, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) [here-
inafter Hamdan Government Brief ]. 
 207. For a thoughtful discussion about the impact of Justice Rutledge’s dis-
sent on the Court’s later jurisprudence, see Craig Green, Wiley Rutledge, Ex-
ecutive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at War, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 99, 
154–70 (2006). 
 208. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 74 & n.37 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing) (“This conclusion is derived from the setting in which these Articles are 
placed. I do not agree that the context gives any support to this argument.”). 
Rutledge proceeded thoroughly to rebut the Court’s analysis, and concluded 
that “the meaning of subsection 3 . . . is related to the meaning of subsection 1; 
and subsection 1 is no more clearly restricted to punishments and proceedings 
in disciplinary matters than is subsection 3.” Id. 
 209. Id. at 72–73 & n.36 (noting that Yamashita was “interned in conformi-
ty with Article 9 of [the] Convention”). 
 210. In view of his statement that the Court “does not hold that the Geneva 
Convention is not binding upon the United States and no such contention has 
been made in this case,” id. at 72, there was little reason for Justice Rutledge 
to dwell on this point. Nonetheless, he devoted over five hundred words in a 
footnote to dispelling any such notion. Id. at 72 n.36. 
 211. Id. at 72 n.36 
 212. Id. 
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evidence of customary international law, and that it be held 
binding as such.213 
Justice Rutledge emphasized the pragmatic and strategic 
implications of his reading of the Convention. He rooted his 
construction of Article 82—that the Convention is binding—on 
the safety of captured armed forces, and again cited the safety 
of captured U.S. soldiers in arguing that the provisions of the 
Articles of War applied to Yamashita.214 Of the argument that 
U.S. noncompliance with the 1929 Geneva Convention merely 
gave Japan a right of indemnity and that Article 60 conferred 
no personal rights upon Yamashita, Justice Rutledge caustical-
ly pointed out that “[e]xecuted men are not much aided by post-
war claims for indemnity.”215 In short, he characterized the Ge-
neva Convention of 1929 as “our law” and concluded that Ya-
mashita’s trial was violative of it.216 
2. Probing Humanitarian Law to Define War Crimes 
As in Quirin, discussed above in reference to Hague law, 
the need to define the charges levied against General Yamashi-
ta and the Eisentrager petitioners provided the second impetus 
for the Court to approach humanitarian law in these cases. In 
addition to addressing petitioners’ claims allegedly arising un-
der humanitarian law, the Court also drew on the Fourth 
Hague Convention and the 1929 Geneva Convention in defining 
these charges, and thus demonstrated that petitioners’ trials by 
military commission were permissible. The extent to which 
these humanitarian law treaties supported the proposition that 
the charges against petitioners stated an offense was a matter 
of intense disagreement between the majority and the dissents, 
particularly in Yamashita.217 Interpretation of humanitarian 
law treaties thus became central to the resolution of the cases. 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. Justice Rutledge argued that the Articles of War were applicable both 
on their own terms and as a function of Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Conven-
tion. See id. at 61–72. 
 215. Id. at 77. 
 216. Id. at 78 (characterizing the failure to provide notice as required by 
Article 60 as “only another instance of the commission’s failure to observe the 
obligations of our law”). 
 217. The inquiry was thorny in part because the Hague Conventions and 
the 1929 Geneva Convention have few explicit penal provisions. See STEVEN 
R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (2d ed. 2001); see also Yves Sandoz, 
Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 393, 395–99 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
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a.  Yamashita 
The Court in Yamashita echoed Quirin’s observation that 
Congress had “not attempted to codify the law of war or to 
mark its precise boundaries . . . . [but rather] had incorporated, 
by reference, as within the preexisting jurisdiction of military 
commissions created by appropriate military command, all of-
fenses which are defined as such by the law of war.”218 Hence, 
Yamashita’s trial by military commission was only appropriate 
if the charged offense was a violation of the law of war. Yama-
shita’s challenge, then, tasked the Court with determining 
whether the crime charged was, in fact, such a violation.219  
Yamashita was charged with “unlawfully disregard[ing] 
and fail[ing] to discharge his duty as commander to control the 
operations of the members of his command.”220 The Court en-
gaged in a lengthy analysis, concluding that this charge was 
indeed recognized by the law of war.221 The bill of particulars 
filed against Yamashita further specified the acts for which 
Yamashita was alleged to be responsible, including “a deliber-
ate plan and purpose to massacre and exterminate a large part 
of the civilian population of Batangas Province . . . as a result of 
which more than 25,000 men, women and children, all un-
armed noncombatant civilians, were brutally mistreated and 
killed.”222 The Court cited the Fourth Hague Convention Regu-
lations in recognizing that these acts constituted violations of 
the law of war.223 But because Yamashita did not himself com-
mit these acts, the question was “whether the law of war im-
poses on an army commander a duty to take such appropriate 
measures as are within his power to control the troops under 
his command for the prevention of the specified acts which are 
 
 218. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7–8. 
 219. Apart from the charge against Yamashita, the Court also noted in dic-
ta another violation of the law of war: “[I]t is a violation of the law of war 
. . . to inflict capital punishment on prisoners of war without affording to them 
opportunity to make a defense.” Id. at 24 n.10. 
 220. Id. at 13–14. The charge goes on: “[P]ermitting them to commit brutal 
atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United States and of its 
allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and . . . thereby violat[ing] 
the laws of war.” Id. For a detailed description of the horrors committed by 
troops under Yamashita’s command, see Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, 
Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Op-
erations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 178 n.100 (2000) (citing 4 UNITED NATIONS 
WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 4 (1948)). 
 221. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14–18.  
 222. Id. at 14. 
 223. Id.  
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violations of the laws of war.”224 The Court concluded that it 
did.225 
To reach this conclusion, the Court reasoned that because 
the failure by a commander to check the excesses of his troops 
would almost certainly result in violations of the law of war, 
the purpose of the law would be undermined if the commander 
could neglect to take such measures with impunity.226 The 
Court found support for this reasoning in several humanitarian 
law treaties. It cited the Fourth Hague Convention227 and the 
Regulations attached thereto,228 the Tenth Hague Convention 
relating to the bombardment of naval vessels,229 and the Gene-
va Convention of 1929,230 and found that these provisions 
“plainly imposed” on Yamashita “an affirmative duty” to take 
steps to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.231  
Justice Murphy filed a strong dissent, arguing that the 
charges against Yamashita were “unrecognized” in interna-
tional law.232 He chided the Court’s “vague and indefinite refer-
ences” to the Hague and Geneva Conventions.233 After review-
ing various treatises on the laws of war to demonstrate that the 
term “responsible” in the context of the Hague provision relied 
upon by the majority was ambiguous, Justice Murphy con-
cluded: 
 
 224. Id. at 14–15.  
 225. Id. at 17. 
 226. Id. at 15 (“[T]he law of war presupposes that its violation is to be 
avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are 
to some extent responsible for their subordinates.”). 
 227. Id. (stating that lawful belligerents must be “commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates” (citing Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 
33, art. 1)). 
 228. Id. at 16 (noting that Article 43 “requires that the commander of a 
force occupying enemy territory, as was petitioner, shall take all the measures 
in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, 
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 229. Id. (“[C]ommanders in chief of the belligerent vessels ‘must see that 
the above Articles are properly carried out.’” (citing Fourth Hague Convention, 
supra note 33, art. 19)). 
 230. Id. at 15–16 (noting that Article 26 “makes it the duty of the com-
manders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to provide for the details of execu-
tion of the foregoing articles [of the convention], as well as for unforeseen cas-
es” (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 231. Id. at 16. The Court goes on to point out that “[o]bviously charges of 
violations of the law of war . . . need not be stated with the precision of a com-
mon law indictment.” Id. at 17. 
 232. See id. at 35 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 233. Id. at 36. 
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It is apparent beyond dispute that [the term] was not used in this 
particular Hague Convention to hold the commander of a defeated 
army to any high standard of efficiency when he is under destructive 
attack; nor was it used to impute to him any criminal responsibility 
for war crimes committed by troops under his command under such 
circumstances.234 
The other provisions, Justice Murphy stated, were “on their 
face equally devoid of relevance.”235 
Justice Murphy’s principal criticism was that the Conven-
tion provisions did not speak to the unique facts of the case: 
they were not relevant where “the troops of a commander com-
mit atrocities while under heavily adverse battle conditions.”236 
Moreover, Justice Murphy interpreted language in the Army’s 
Basic Field Manual on Rules of Land Warfare to limit individ-
ual criminal responsibility for violations of the laws of war to 
“those who commit the offenses or who order or direct their 
commission.”237 Both Justices Murphy and Rutledge concluded 
that the charge against Yamashita was unprecedented, without 
sufficient definition in international law, and hence could not 
support his trial by military commission.238  
b. Eisentrager 
In Eisentrager, the Court similarly analyzed the law of war 
to determine if the charged offense was cognizable by military 
commission. In that case, the Court considered habeas petitions 
from twenty-one German nationals who had been tried and 
convicted by military commission of violating the law of war by 
collecting and furnishing intelligence to the Japanese army 
about American troop movements after the German High 
Command’s unconditional surrender.239 Repatriated to Germa-
ny to serve their sentences, the prisoners were held at 
Landsberg Prison, then under U.S. Army control, when the Su-
preme Court heard the case.240 
 
 234. Id. at 37. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. at 37–38. 
 238. Id. at 40 (“The only conclusion I can draw is that the charge made 
against the petitioner is clearly without precedent in international law or in 
the annals of recorded military history.”); id. at 43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“I 
have not been able to find precedent for the proceeding in the system of any 
nation founded in the basic principles of our constitutional democracy, in the 
laws of war or in other internationally binding authority or usage.”). 
 239. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765–66 (1950). 
 240. Id. 
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The Eisentrager petitioners claimed that the military 
commission lacked jurisdiction because the charge against 
them did not allege a violation of the law of war, and vaguely 
framed the issue as a violation of Articles I and III of the Con-
stitution.241 The Court cited Quirin and Yamashita in holding 
that the military commission was indeed a lawful tribunal in 
which to judge enemy offenses against the law of war.242 As to 
petitioners’ unclear constitutional challenge to the “jurisdic-
tion” of the military commission, the Court pointed to Con-
gress’s constitutional power to “make rules concerning captures 
on land and water, which this Court has construed as an inde-
pendent substantive power.”243 As in Yamashita and Quirin, 
the Eisentrager Court was thus tasked with surveying the law 
of war to determine whether the charged offense constituted a 
violation. As in these prior cases, the Court again answered in 
the affirmative.244  
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited “an old cus-
tomary rule, since enacted by Article 35 of the Hague Regula-
tions” that “capitulations must be scrupulously adhered to.”245 
The Court took pains to point out, however, the very circum-
scribed role it played in finding that the offense validly charged 
a war crime: it was for the military commission to determine 
whether, in fact, petitioners had committed the war crime and 
whether the law of war applied in the first instance.246 In short, 
the Court purported simply to survey the law of war and de-
termine that the charged offense constituted a violation. 
Three members of the Court argued in dissent that the is-
sue of the sufficiency of the charge—and hence the Court’s cita-
 
 241. Id. at 785–86.  
 242. Id. at 786. 
 243. Id. at 786–89 (citation omitted). The Court also rooted the commission 
in the Commander-in-Chief Clause, noting that petitioner’s challenge thus 
represented a “challenge to conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs, for which 
the President is exclusively responsible.” Id. 
 244. Id. at 787 (“Breach of the terms of an act of surrender is no novelty 
among war crimes.”). 
 245. Id. (quoting Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33). The Court also 
cited, among other authorities, a treatise, which in turn quoted Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster: “If there is one rule of the law of war more clear and per-
emptory than another, it is that compacts between enemies, such as truces and 
capitulations, shall be faithfully adhered to . . . .” Id. at 787 n.13 (quoting 7 
JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EMBODIED IN 
DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, TREATIES, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 330 (1906)). 
 246. Id. at 788. 
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tion to humanitarian law—was “wholly irrelevant,” and the 
Court’s conclusions in this regard were “gratuitous.”247 In this 
view, the only issue raised was whether a civilian court can 
hear the habeas petitions. Citing Quirin and Yamashita, the 
dissent noted that there was no blanket prohibition on the ex-
ercise of habeas jurisdiction over petitions by enemy alien bel-
ligerents. Rather, the “clear holding” of those cases was that 
habeas jurisdiction is available even to enemy aliens and can-
not be denied merely because the prisoners were held outside 
U.S. territory.248 
After explaining the impropriety of the majority’s inquiry, 
Justice Black, writing for the dissent, took issue with the sub-
stantive finding that the passing of information to the Japanese 
after Germany’s surrender in fact constituted a war crime. If, 
as the petition alleged, the prisoners were “under the control of 
the armed forces of the Japanese Empire” during the period at 
issue, the question of whether obedience to their Japanese 
commanders “constitute[ed] ‘unlawful’ belligerency . . . is not so 
simple a question as the Court presumes.”249 Justice Black re-
called the Court’s caution in Quirin that military tribunals can 
punish only “unlawful” combatants. “It must be remembered,” 
he wrote, “that legitimate ‘acts of warfare,’ however murderous, 
do not justify criminal conviction.”250  
3. Understanding the Court’s Early Reliance on Geneva Law 
The Court’s use of humanitarian law in Yamashita and Ei-
sentrager suggests several observations. First, the Court of-
fered informative, if controversial, analysis of specific provi-
sions of the Geneva (and Hague) Conventions. The Court’s 
application of law to the facts yielded substantive conclusions of 
law and pronouncements as to the content of humanitarian 
law. Second, the Court purported to analyze the entire corpus 
of the “laws of war” to determine whether the offenses charged 
constituted violations so as to be cognizable by military com-
mission. Third, the Court affirmed that the Eisentrager detain-
ees are “entitled” to the protections of the 1929 Convention, but 
 
 247. Id. at 792–94 (Black, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that, 
even if relevant, the war crimes question was not before the Court, as it was 
not reached by the trial court. Id. at 792–93. 
 248. Id. at 794–95. A variation of this view, of course, would be adopted by 
the Court over fifty years later in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
See infra Part III.C. 
 249. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 793 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 250. Id. 
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held the convention inapplicable by relying on Yamashita’s con-
textual reading of the relevant provisions. 
What emerges from the Court’s analysis? First, in terms of 
substance, the Yamashita Court rooted the duty of command 
responsibility in humanitarian law and identified its breach as 
a war crime. While the principle did not originate during World 
War II, the decision can be seen as an important contribution to 
the development of the doctrine.251  
One may counter, as did Justice Rutledge,252 that the 
Court’s use of humanitarian law represented a misapplication 
of the treaties and was designed to justify the imposition of the 
death penalty on a defeated enemy general after the conclusion 
of a wrenching world war. Indeed, the Court did not respond to 
Justice Rutledge’s point-by-point refutation of its contextual 
reading of the Geneva Convention that rendered it inapplicable 
to General Yamashita and on which the Court relied in Eisen-
trager.253 Regardless of the soundness of Yamashita’s textual 
analysis of the 1929 Geneva Convention, it is clear that the 
Court’s reliance on humanitarian law to ratify Yamashita’s tri-
al and execution is a landmark in the Supreme Court’s treat-
ment of IHL. 
Similarly, it is possible to read Eisentrager as a modest 
contribution to humanitarian law jurisprudence through its 
somewhat less controversial identification of petitioners’ pass-
ing of information to the Japanese following Germany’s sur-
render as a violation of the law of war.254 Justice Black took is-
sue with this finding in dissent, but his criticism was more 
circumspect than the dissent in Yamashita, given that the par-
ties did not brief or argue the point.255 Although its declaration 
of a war crime is subject to some criticism, the Court relied on 
humanitarian law and reached a substantive legal conclusion 
based at least in part on this reliance. 
 
 251. Command responsibility, of course, is properly located in the domain 
of international criminal law, not humanitarian law. Accordingly, the deci-
sion’s substantive contribution is not to humanitarian law proper. For a sum-
mary of the roots of international criminal responsibility in humanitarian law, 
see RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 217, at 80–107; see also Smidt, supra note 
220, at 176 (“It was during the war crimes trials themselves that the doctrine 
of command responsibility developed. This was the basis for the defense alle-
gation in [Yamashita] that prosecution based on a command responsibility 
theory was tantamount to ex post facto law.” (citations omitted)). 
 252. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 6, 42–43 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 253. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789. 
 254. See id. at 778. 
 255. Id. at 793–94 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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Second, in terms of procedure—how the Court invokes hu-
manitarian law—Yamashita and Eisentrager solidified the ap-
proach initially adopted in Quirin and discussed above. Specifi-
cally, the Court offered robust analysis of humanitarian law in 
the course of assessing a charge levied against petitioners to 
determine if it properly alleged a violation of the law of war.256 
In both Yamashita and Eisentrager, in the course of finding pe-
titioners’ trials by military commission to be lawful, the Court 
explicitly applied the law of war—as embodied in the various 
Hague Conventions and 1929 Geneva Convention—to the facts 
behind the charges levied against them.257  
Third, an important contribution of the Supreme Court to 
humanitarian law jurisprudence emerges in the interaction be-
tween majority and dissent on humanitarian law issues. Here, 
it is useful to return to this Article’s point of departure. Hu-
manitarian law treaties generally lack authoritative mechan-
isms for interpretation—a task principally left to state parties 
with some occasional guidance from the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross. One might expect the Supreme Court to 
contribute to the global store of humanitarian law decisions by 
applying IHL provisions to the facts before it in traditional 
common-law fashion, thus yielding authoritative and preceden-
tial interpretations from which other bodies faced with similar 
issues might draw. And yet, because other interpretive bodies 
and mechanisms (treaty bodies, foreign courts, thematic mech-
anisms of the United Nations, and so on) do not perceive the 
Court’s pronouncements as “binding,” such bodies are likely to 
give dissenting opinions greater consideration in drawing on 
Supreme Court precedent as persuasive authority. While a 
united Court, of course, speaks more loudly than a lone dissen-
ter, a more thorough humanitarian law analysis in a dissent 
may prove more useful to another interpretive body than an in-
ferior analysis that garners a majority. In other words, to the 
 
 256. Again, it is the law of war’s incorporation into the Articles of War, supra 
notes 109–11 and accompanying text, and later into the UCMJ, supra note 125 
and accompanying text, that prompts the Court’s humanitarian law analysis. 
 257. It is the majority’s application of the law to the facts that draws the 
dissent’s strongest criticism. Black argues that the facts do not support the 
majority’s hasty leap to the identification of a war crime. If petitioners were in 
fact under the control of the Japanese forces, their acts may have been “legi-
timate ‘acts of warfare,’” which do not justify criminal conviction. Eisentrager, 
339 U.S. at 793 (Black, J., dissenting). There is thus some question about how 
thoughtfully the Court applied the law to the facts. The point remains, howev-
er, that the Court offers explicit analysis of the facts against a well-defined 
legal standard. See id. at 787–88 (majority opinion). 
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extent one is interested in the content and quality of the hu-
manitarian law analysis rather than the mere holding of the 
case, Yamashita and Eisentrager reveal that the Supreme 
Court’s greatest institutional contribution to an international 
jurisprudence of humanitarian law may be that a fuller pic-
ture—a more thoughtful and nuanced articulation and applica-
tion—of the treaty provisions at issue emerges through the 
combination of majority opinion and vigorous dissent. 
In conclusion, the Court’s opinions in Yamashita and Ei-
sentrager are important milestones in the Supreme Court’s ad-
judication of humanitarian law issues, which (1) offer a sub-
stantive contribution to humanitarian law jurisprudence, and 
(2) frame the Court’s later engagements with humanitarian 
law. Both the majority opinions and the dissents engage in 
substantive analysis of humanitarian law instruments in the 
course of passing on petitioners’ challenges. In terms of sub-
stance, the Yamashita Court’s reliance on humanitarian law 
contributes to the development of international criminal law 
and demonstrates the flexibility of the humanitarian law re-
gime by identifying Yamashita’s failure to prevent atrocities as 
a war crime. Eisentrager similarly provides explicit precedent 
for the identification of a particular war crime.258 In terms of 
procedure, Yamashita and Eisentrager exemplify the two ave-
nues through which the Court addresses humanitarian law in 
the context of armed conflict: (1) directly adjudicating claims 
allegedly arising under the conventions, and (2) assessing 
charges levied against detainees challenging their trial by mili-
tary commission. Having considered the Court’s first engage-
ment with Geneva law, this Part briefly reviews the Court’s re-
liance on the Geneva Conventions outside the context of armed 
conflict. It then turns to the Court’s most recent, and extensive, 
treatment of Geneva law in the “war on terror” detainee cases. 
B. GENEVA LAW OUTSIDE OF ARMED CONFLICT 
The Court has referred, on four occasions, to the Geneva 
Conventions outside the context of armed conflict. In two of 
these cases, the Court invoked the Geneva Conventions as a 
tool for interpreting the Eighth Amendment bar on “cruel and 
unusual” punishment.259 In holding the death penalty unconsti-
 
 258. As discussed above in supra note 219, the Court also identified anoth-
er violation of the law of war in dicta. 
 259. Such references to international law in adjudicating constitutional is-
sues have a long and perhaps underappreciated history in Supreme Court ju-
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tutional for a petitioner who was fifteen years old at the time of 
his crime, the plurality in Thompson v. Oklahoma cited Article 
68 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as one of “three major 
human rights treaties explicitly [to] prohibit juvenile death 
penalties.”260 Dissenting from the plurality’s holding to affirm 
the seventeen-year-old petitioner’s death sentence in Stanford 
v. Kentucky, Justice Brennan cited the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion for the same proposition, and further pointed out that 
these treaties have been signed or ratified by the United 
States.261 In a separate concurrence in Thompson, Justice 
O’Connor pointed to the ratification of Article 68 of the Third 
Geneva Convention as undermining the dissent’s inference of 
congressional intent (in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act) 
to authorize the death penalty for some fifteen year old fel-
ons.262 Justice O’Connor reasoned that Congress’s having set a 
minimum age for capital punishment in other contexts—
military occupation and for certain drug crimes—suggested 
that it did not intend to set a lower bar for juvenile felons.263 
In the two other cases, the Court made fleeting reference to 
the Geneva Conventions outside the context of armed conflict. 
In Department of Employment v. United States, the Court re-
ferred to the American Red Cross’s “right and . . . obligation to 
meet this Nation’s commitments under various Geneva Con-
ventions” in determining that it is an instrumentality of the 
United States for purposes of immunity from state taxation.264 
In FTC v. A.P.W. Paper Co., the Court held that the paper com-
pany was not barred from using the Red Cross emblem and 
name on its products.265 The Court rejected the argument that 
A.P.W.’s use of the emblem and name was prohibited by certain 
provisions of the Red Cross Act that reserved exclusive rights 
to the American Red Cross, holding that A.P.W.’s use was law-
 
risprudence. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitu-
tion, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2006) (surveying exhaustively this history). 
 260. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988). 
 261. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 262. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 851–52 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice 
O’Connor also pointed to federal legislation limiting application of the death 
penalty for certain drug offenses to persons at least eighteen years of age. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Dep’t of Emp’t v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359 (1966) (citing Gene-
va Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 
Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940; First Geneva Convention, supra note 76; 1929 
Convention, supra note 197). 
 265. FTC v. A.P.W. Paper Co., 328 U.S. 193, 201–02 (1946). 
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ful because it antedated the Act.266 Of the 1929 Geneva Con-
vention’s provision to “prevent the use by private persons” of 
the words or symbol, the Court stated simply that it “is a mat-
ter for the executive and legislative departments.”267 
The Court’s reliance on Geneva law outside the context of 
armed conflict offers little substantive analysis of IHL. The 
Court’s citation to Geneva law in this context, however, sug-
gests several observations. First, references to the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions in Thompson and Stanford can be 
read as evidence of a somewhat loose approach to international 
law. Strictly speaking, the Geneva Conventions are not human 
rights treaties. While the overlap between humanitarian law 
and human rights law is substantial and widely remarked,268 
these bodies of law are distinct and the Thompson plurality’s 
citation to the Fourth Geneva Convention as one of “three ma-
jor human rights treaties” is technically inaccurate.269 Second, 
A.P.W. Paper is congruent with the Court’s general reticence to 
treat as cognizable causes of action allegedly arising under the 
Geneva Conventions—or, as demonstrated in Part II, under the 
various Hague Conventions. As Paul Stephan recently noted, 
one might view the Court’s statement about the 1929 Conven-
tion in Eisentrager as clarifying A.P.W. Paper ’s murky treat-
ment of the self-execution issue: the “obvious scheme” of the 
1929 Convention, as the Court said in Eisentrager, was to di-
rect responsibility for its enforcement to the political branches. 
The post-war Court, in other words, was unwilling to suggest 
that the Convention operated independently of its implement-
ing statutes.270 As discussed above, this theme runs throughout 
the Court’s IHL jurisprudence. 
 
 266. Id. at 200–01. 
 267. Id. at 203. 
 268. See, e.g., Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Human-
itarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed 
Conflict, 40 ISRAEL L. REV. 310, 310 (2007) (discussing historical developments 
leading to the increasing overlap of the two bodies of law); Meron, supra note 
48, at 243–51 (describing the impact of human rights on the development of 
humanitarian law and the growing convergence of the two spheres). 
 269. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988); see also Stan-
ford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(same), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 270. Stephan, supra note 11, at 13–14. 
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C. GENEVA LAW IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 
The Court’s most remarkable discussion of humanitarian 
law has arisen in the years since September 11, 2001, specifi-
cally in the line of cases relating to detainees at Guantánamo 
Bay. Of the ten cases on the merits in which at least one mem-
ber of the Court references the Geneva Conventions, four arise 
in the “war on terror” context.271 Notably, since its 1950 deci-
sion in Eisentrager, save the few non-substantive references 
discussed above, the Court has largely ignored humanitarian 
law. This gap is, perhaps, unsurprising—as is the reality that 
the “particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age”272 have 
confronted the Court with novel questions occasioning similarly 
novel analysis. In the Guantánamo context, the Court has rec-
ognized the likelihood that “common-law courts simply may not 
have confronted cases with close parallels.”273  
The application of Geneva law to the war on terror has re-
ceived extensive treatment elsewhere.274 A few foundational 
principles that frame the Court’s analysis merit review here. 
First, Article 2, common to the four 1949 Conventions, specifies 
that those Conventions apply to armed conflict or occupation 
between states.275 Second, as between warring states, persons of 
 
 271. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 
674 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 272. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 752. 
 273. See id. The advent of this new age has, of course, also prompted a re-
evaluation of constitutional law issues: “[b]ecause our Nation’s past military 
conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer 
boundaries of war powers undefined.” Id. at 797–98. 
 274. See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TORTURE BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 24–26 (2010); David Glazier, Full 
and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating Mil-
itary Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55, 70–94 (2006); Derek Jinks, 
September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 10–19 (2003); Jordan 
Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 
YALE J. INT’L L. 325, 328–34 (2003); Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, 
and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 328, 335–36 (2002) (discussing 
the import of the Geneva Conventions for military commissions); see also Mo-
fidi & Eckert, supra note 183, at 79–90 (discussing treatment of detainees in 
the war on terror); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendi-
tion and the Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 
298–317 (2006) (discussing the applicability of Geneva law to the Bush Admin-
istration’s practice of rendition). 
 275. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 2 (“[T]he present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed con-
flict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
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either state detained by the other are categorized as either 
prisoners of war or civilian internees.276 The former category of 
persons is protected by the Third Geneva Convention while the 
latter category of persons is protected by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.277 Third, a different line of analysis is required if 
the relevant conflict is not between states, i.e., is “not of an in-
ternational character.”278 In each case reviewed in this section, 
the Court’s analysis suffers from its failure clearly to address 
these points.  
1. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
The Court first referenced Geneva law after September 11, 
2001, in the 2004 case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.279 Hamdi, a U.S. cit-
izen, was seized in Afghanistan, transferred to the U.S. naval 
base in Guantánamo Bay, and later transferred to a naval brig 
in Virginia after U.S. authorities learned of his citizenship.280 
The executive branch deemed Hamdi an “enemy combatant” 
 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall 
also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resis-
tance.”); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 2; Second Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 182, art. 2; First Geneva Convention, supra note 76, art. 2. 
 276. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF 
WAR 51 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY] 
(“Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: 
he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a 
civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, or again, a member of the medical 
personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is 
no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.”); see 
also Gabor Rona, Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant In-
ventory of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499, 506 (2005) (“The Geneva Con-
ventions are constructed so as to provide for no gaps in its coverage of enemy 
soldiers and civilians. The notion that someone who fails to qualify for POW sta-
tus is therefore beyond the coverage of the Geneva Conventions is incorrect.”). 
 277. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 4 (describing pro-
tected persons); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 4 (same). 
 278. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 3 (“In the case of 
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound 
to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions . . . .”); Third Geneva Con-
vention, supra note 182, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 182, 
art. 3; First Geneva Convention, supra note 76, art. 3. 
 279. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 280. Id. at 510. 
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and held him without access to an attorney in solitary confine-
ment.281 
Among other arguments against his detention, Hamdi 
raised one claim based on the Geneva Conventions.282 He 
claimed that Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention required 
him to be treated as a prisoner of war until a competent tri-
bunal determined otherwise.283 A deeply divided Supreme 
Court declined to consider that question.284 Justice O’Connor, 
writing for a plurality of the Court, instead determined that the 
Constitution entitled Hamdi to judicial review of his deten-
tion.285  
Strictly speaking, the opinion answered “only the narrow 
question” of whether the September 18, 2001, Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorized the detention of 
“enemy combatants,” such as Hamdi.286 In answering this ques-
tion, however, the plurality drew upon the law of war, includ-
ing the Third Geneva Convention.287 In a broad sense, then, the 
Court uses the Convention as an aid in statutory construction. 
A careful parsing of the opinion against the background of the 
 
 281. Id.; see also Brief of Petitioners at 5–6, 10, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).  
 282. Hamdi made the additional argument in the Fourth Circuit that his 
continued detention was prohibited by the Conventions because the interna-
tional armed conflict had ended with the installation of the Karzai govern-
ment. See Brief of the Petitioners/Appellees at 53–54, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 
F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-7338). 
 283. Id. at 38–39. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 n.2 (“Because we hold that Hamdi is constitu-
tionally entitled to the process described above, we need not address at this 
time whether any treaty guarantees him similar access to a tribunal for a de-
termination of his status.”). 
 286. Id. at 516. The AUMF authorized “all necessary and appropriate 
force” to be used against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with 
the 9/11 attacks. Id. at 510. By narrowly tailoring the question before it, the 
plurality did not reach the government’s argument that Article II provides the 
executive plenary detention authority. Id. at 517. Nor do any of the four opin-
ions define “enemy combatant.” Rather, the plurality accepts, for the purpose 
of the case, the government’s definition as one who was “part of or supporting 
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and 
who engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there.” Id. at 516 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 287. Id. at 518. The plurality finds the language of the AUMF to represent 
“explicit congressional authorization” for the detention of enemy combatants. 
Id. at 519 (“[I]t is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language 
of detention. . . . [I]n permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ 
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow 
circumstances considered here.”). 
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Court’s prior treatment of humanitarian law, however, reveals 
that the plurality draws on humanitarian law in four different 
ways. 
a. Hamdi’s Use of Humanitarian Law 
First, through reliance on its precedent, the Court inter-
preted the customary law of war to emphasize the centrality of 
detention to waging war.288 Critical to the plurality’s conclusion 
that the AUMF authorized Hamdi’s detention was its interme-
diate finding that detention is a “fundamental incident of wag-
ing war.”289 This proposition allowed the plurality to conclude 
that detention was therefore necessarily contemplated in the 
“all necessary and appropriate force” language of the AUMF.290 
The plurality quoted Ex parte Quirin in noting that “universal 
agreement and practice” sanction detention of enemy bellig-
erents during war,291 and went on to frame the practice of war-
time detention as a means to prevent belligerents from return-
ing to the battlefield.292 In short, the Court reaffirmed and 
emphasized its assessment in Quirin as to the content of the 
customary law of war. 
Second, the plurality invoked the law of war as persuasive 
authority to support its conclusion that Hamdi’s citizen status 
did not preclude his detention.293 The plurality found no mean-
ingful distinction between Hamdi and the citizen-detainee in 
Quirin294 and cited for support the Lieber Code, which it un-
derstood to “contemplate[] . . . that ‘captured rebels’ would be 
 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 518–19. 
 290. Id. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Souter flatly rejected this 
claim, arguing that the Non-Detention Act required “clear congressional au-
thorization before any citizen can be placed in a cell,” which the vague language 
of the AUMF cannot be read to provide. Id. at 543, 547 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 291. Id. at 518–19 (plurality opinion). 
 292. The Court cited the following three authorities for the proposition that 
the purpose of wartime detention is to incapacitate the detainee, not to serve a 
punitive function: In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946); WILLIAM 
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (rev. 2d ed. 1920); Yasmin 
Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 571, 572 
(2002) (quoting decision of Nuremburg Military Tribunal, reprinted in 41 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 172, 229 (1947)). Justice Scalia faulted the plurality’s application of 
this principle to Hamdi because these sources do not speak to the detention of 
U.S. citizens. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 574 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 293. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (plurality opinion). 
 294. Id. The plurality found it of no moment that Quirin petitioner Haupt 
was detained for the purpose of war crimes prosecution and Hamdi was de-
tained solely to prevent his return to the battlefield. Id. 
  
2011] HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE COURT 1393 
 
treated ‘as prisoners of war.’”295 The inference, of course, is that 
the Lieber Code, the first modern codification of the law of war, 
offered precedent for the wartime detention of U.S. citizens. 
Third, the plurality cited the Third Geneva Convention in 
assessing Hamdi’s claim that his detention was “indefinite.”296 
In contrast to the Yamashita Court’s analysis of the 1929 Con-
vention, the plurality offered little textual analysis of the 1949 
Convention. Rather, it simply recognized the “clearly estab-
lished principle of the law of war that detention may last no 
longer than active hostilities”297 and “agree[d] that indefinite 
detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.”298 
The Court found, however, that Hamdi’s detention was not of 
this kind. “Longstanding law-of-war principles” guided the 
Court to construe the AUMF to authorize detention “for the du-
ration of the relevant conflict,” which the plurality defined as 
the period “[U.S.] troops are still involved in active combat in 
Afghanistan.”299  
The plurality hedged on this point, however, pointing out 
that its understanding that detention is permitted “for the du-
ration of the relevant conflict” may change if the war on terror-
ism presents a situation not envisioned during the development 
of the laws of war.300 The plurality thus explicitly tethered its 
pronouncement on the permissibility of Hamdi’s detention to 
the current state of the law of war.301 
Fourth, the plurality mentioned the Third Geneva Conven-
tion in elucidating the kind of process required by the Constitu-
tion for citizen-detainees in Hamdi’s position.302 Though the 
 
 295. Id.  
 296. Id. at 519–20. Specifically, the plurality responded to the suggestion 
that the AUMF does not authorize indefinite detention. Id.  
 297. Id. at 520 (employing the “see” cite to the Third Geneva Convention, 
supra note 182, and the “see also” cite to the Second Hague Convention of 
1899, supra note 57, the Fourth Hague Convention, supra note 33, and the 
1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 197). 
 298. Id. at 521. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. (“If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely un-
like those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, 
that understanding may unravel.”). 
 301. Two years later Hamdan argued that his detention fell into precisely 
this category. See Brief for Petitioner at 34, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Hamdan Petitioner’s Brief ] (quoting 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, and arguing that “this case presents the question Ham-
di left open”). 
 302. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538. 
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plurality upheld Hamdi’s detention, it found that the process 
proposed by the government was constitutionally inadequate,303 
and ultimately held that “a citizen-detainee seeking to chal-
lenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive 
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair op-
portunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a 
neutral decisionmaker.”304 After elucidating the basic process 
implicit in this formulation,305 the Court pointed out that these 
standards “could be met by an appropriately authorized and 
properly constituted military tribunal.”306 The plurality sug-
gested that adequate process was already employed under cur-
rent military regulations for detainees asserting prisoner of 
war status under the Third Geneva Convention.307  
In sum, the plurality employed humanitarian law (1) 
through reliance on and elaboration of precedent interpreting 
the customary laws of war, (2) as persuasive authority to sup-
port its reading of Quirin that there is no bar on the detention 
of U.S. citizens, (3) as a tool of statutory construction in assess-
ing Hamdi’s claim that the AUMF does not authorize indefinite 
detention, and (4) to illustrate a context in which constitution-
ally adequate procedures to challenge one’s detention exist.  
b. The Court’s Reluctance to Engage Holistically the Corpus of 
IHL 
The Hamdi decision is complex and ambiguous, as evi-
denced by the Court’s issuance of no fewer than four opinions, 
 
 303. Id. at 532. The government had urged that the factual statements 
presented in a sole Defense Department declaration constituted sufficient fact-
finding in part because Hamdi’s seizure took place in a combat zone. Id. at 
526–28. The plurality recognized both Hamdi’s liberty interest and the “weigh-
ty and sensitive governmental interests” at stake and balanced the competing 
interests under the due process balancing test elucidated in Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528–32.  
 304. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
 305. While the detainee must have an opportunity to be heard, “proceed-
ings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Ex-
ecutive at a time of ongoing military conflict,” which may entail admission of 
hearsay and a presumption in favor of the government’s evidence. Id. The plu-
rality envisioned a burden-shifting scheme in which the government must first 
proffer “credible evidence,” which the alleged combatant detainee would then 
have an opportunity to rebut. Id. at 533–34. 
 306. Id. at 538. 
 307. These regulations make available military tribunals to render detain-
ee-status determinations. Id. (citation omitted). This reference by the plurality 
is critical to Justice Roberts’s invocation of the Geneva Convention in his 
Boumediene dissent. See infra Part III.C.3. 
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none of which garnered a majority. The complexities of human-
itarian law are at the center of the plurality opinion’s lack of 
clarity. As one commentator has pointed out, much confusion 
stems from the Court’s “reluctance to grapple directly with the 
contours of international humanitarian law and from its failure 
to articulate clearly the relationship between that body of law 
and U.S. law.”308 The central problem with the plurality opin-
ion’s approach is its selective reliance on humanitarian law 
principles without placing such concepts in the broader context 
of this body of law. The consequence is a jurisprudential confu-
sion of concepts.  
The plurality alternatively did not recognize its reliance on 
humanitarian law and purported to rely on humanitarian law 
principles, but applied them without the necessary context. As 
one commentator argues, for example, the Court’s recognition 
of the concept of “enemy combatant” demonstrated an unre-
marked reliance on humanitarian law.309 While it may be more 
precisely stated that the plurality was relying on the Court’s 
interpretation of humanitarian law in Quirin—recall that the 
terms “enemy combatant” and “unlawful belligerent” do not ap-
pear in the Conventions; rather, the Quirin Court used human-
itarian law to infer the existence of such a category310—the 
point remains that the Hamdi plurality did not clearly articu-
late its use of humanitarian law.  
Similarly, the plurality’s reliance on the Third Geneva 
Convention as well as various provisions of Hague law for the 
principle that “detention may last no longer than active hostili-
ties” is problematic—though here the analysis is more incom-
plete than inaccurate.311 The plurality failed to consider explic-
itly two issues critical to the invocation of the Third Geneva 
Convention: whether the “relevant conflict” was the war be-
tween the United States and Afghanistan or between the Unit-
 
 308. Jenny S. Martinez, International Decision: Availability of U.S. Court 
to Review Decision to Hold U.S. Citizen as Enemy Combatant—Executive Pow-
er in War on Terror, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 785 (2004). 
 309. See id. at 785–86. One might counter that the plurality merely 
adopted the term as descriptive of Hamdi for the purposes of the case, and 
thus did not “import” any substantive concepts of humanitarian law. 
 310. See supra Part II.A. 
 311. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. Depending on the nature of the underlying 
armed conflict, the relevant IHL provisions may offer only prohibitions, not af-
firmative grants of detention authority. See Cerone, supra note 43, at 410–12; 
Martinez, supra note 308, at 786. The cited provision actually states: “Prison-
ers of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation 
of active hostilities.” Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 118. 
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ed States and al Qaeda, and whether Hamdi was a civilian or a 
combatant. 
As noted above, all detainees captured during an interna-
tional armed conflict are either prisoners of war or civilian de-
tainees, while a separate, more limited, set of rules applies to 
conflicts “not of an international character.” The Court, howev-
er, did not clarify the “relevant conflict.” If, on the one hand, 
the relevant conflict was the U.S.-Afghanistan war, Article 2 
was plainly satisfied because that conflict arose “between two 
or more of the High Contracting Parties.”312 On this interpreta-
tion, Hamdi’s Article 5 argument should have prevailed, as-
suming the Geneva Conventions to be self-executing.313 On the 
other hand, if the relevant conflict was the amorphous “war on 
terrorism,” or more specifically, the transnational armed con-
flict between the United States and al Qaeda, the Article 2 cri-
teria may not have been met, rendering the provision cited by 
the plurality inapplicable in the first instance.314 Moreover, the 
plurality’s silence as to Hamdi’s claim of prisoner of war status 
also raises a question of whether it properly invoked the Third 
Geneva Convention. If Hamdi in fact was not a belligerent, as 
he claimed, then the relevant instruments were the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention and Additional Protocol I, though again this 
depends on the nature of the underlying conflict.315 The Court’s 
 
 312. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 2. Still, the interna-
tional armed conflict arguably ended with the installation of the Karzai gov-
ernment, thus requiring a separate legal basis for the continued applicability 
of the full provisions of the Convention. See Alec Walen & Ingo Venzke, Un-
constitutional Detention of Nonresident Aliens: Revisiting the Supreme Court’s 
Treatment of the Law of War in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 67 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 
843, 851 (2007); Martinez, supra note 308, at 786–88 (citing International 
Humanitarian Law and Terrorism: Questions and Answers, INT’L COMMITTEE 
RED CROSS (May 5, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/ 
documents/faq/terrorism-faq-050504.htm).  
 313. Whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing is a point of con-
tention in the lower courts that the Supreme Court has so far declined to re-
solve. Compare United States v. Khadr, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1220 n.4 (Ct. 
Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2007) (noting that the Geneva Conventions are “generally 
viewed as self-executing treaties”), and United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 
2d 541, 553 n.20 (E.D. Va. 2002) (same), with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 
450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003) (viewing the Geneva Conventions as non-self-
executing), rev’d on other grounds, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 314. See Walen & Venzke, supra note 312, at 850–52 (discussing the 
Court’s confusion of the “war on terror” with the war in Afghanistan). 
 315. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Fourth Ge-
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decision not to address these issues may have been dispositive 
to the case.316 
Ingrid Wuerth offers several further criticisms of the 
Hamdi plurality’s use of humanitarian law.317 First, she argues 
that Quirin and the other sources upon which the plurality re-
lied318 offer only weak support for the conclusion that detention 
is a “fundamental incident” of war.319 The gist of this criticism 
is that the plurality misconstrued humanitarian law in inter-
preting the scope of the AUMF’s detention authority.320 Second, 
Wuerth argues that the plurality asked and answered the 
wrong question in concluding that the law of war provides “no 
bar” to the detention of U.S. citizens.321 In terms of the AUMF, 
she argues, this approach would broaden the scope of authori-
zation to include everything not specifically prohibited by the 
law of war, as opposed to authorizing only conduct “fundamen-
tal” to waging war.322 Third, Wuerth recognizes that the plural-
ity ignored the domestic status of the Geneva Conventions: it 
did not point out that the United States is a party to the trea-
ties, consider whether the Conventions are self-executing, or 
 
neva Convention, supra note 182, art. 78; see also Walen & Venzke, supra note 
312, at 854–57.  
 316. See Martinez, supra note 308, at 786–88 (“Even if the U.S. Congress, 
in enacting the AUMF, intended to authorize implicitly the detention of indi-
viduals to the extent customary under the laws of war, that authority would 
have ended with the termination of the international armed conflict . . . .”). 
Martinez goes on to characterize the plurality’s approach as “embark[ing] on a 
questionable path toward creating its own, new constitutional common law of 
war, ungrounded either in international humanitarian law or in any specific 
legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress.” Id. 
 317. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, Interna-
tional Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 307–19 
(2005) (analyzing the use of international humanitarian law in the Hamdi 
plurality opinion). 
 318. See supra notes 289–92 and accompanying text. 
 319. See Wuerth, supra note 317, at 309–16 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion)). 
 320. See id. at 313–14 (“It is one thing to reason that Congress authorized 
the President to detain in ways affirmatively sanctioned and regulated (and 
thus also limited) by the law of war; it is quite another to rely on some law-of-
war authorities to support the claim of congressional authorization for a de-
tention that purportedly falls outside the scope of those authorities.”). 
 321. See id. at 316–18 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519). 
 322. See id. at 317–18 (noting that the absence of a prohibition on such de-
tention in the law of war and the purposes of detention were the “only evi-
dence the plurality cited to support reading the AUMF to include” the deten-
tion of U.S. citizens). 
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suggest whether either feature is relevant in using humanitar-
ian law to interpret the AUMF.323  
Justice Souter offered the more substantial analysis of 
humanitarian law in a separate opinion, in which he concurred 
in the judgment.324 He took a different view of Hamdi’s Geneva 
claims, arguing that the Bush Administration did not act in ac-
cordance with the Geneva Conventions because it failed to treat 
Hamdi as a prisoner of war.325 Citing Article 4 of the Third Ge-
neva Convention, Justice Souter stated that Hamdi was “pre-
sumably” a Taliban detainee because “he was taken bearing 
arms on the Taliban side of a field of battle in Afghanistan” and 
would therefore “seem to qualify for treatment as a prisoner of 
war under the Third Geneva Convention.”326 Citing Article 5 of 
the Convention, Justice Souter noted that to the extent there 
was doubt about Hamdi’s status, he was to be presumptively 
treated as a prisoner of war until a competent tribunal deter-
mined otherwise.327 Yet Justice Souter remained circumspect in 
this analysis, openly admitting that “[w]hether, or to what de-
gree, the Government is in fact violating the Geneva Conven-
tion and is thus acting outside the customary usages of war are 
not matters I can resolve at this point.”328 Justice Souter 
rightly pointed to the presumption of prisoner-of-war status 
 
 323. See id. at 318–19. 
 324. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 548–51 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter 
joined the plurality to conclude that on remand Hamdi should have a mean-
ingful opportunity to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. See id. at 553. 
In his concurrence, however, Justice Souter argued that the AUMF did not au-
thorize Hamdi’s detention and disclaimed speaking to the specifics of the plu-
rality’s due process analysis. See id. at 553–54 (“I do not mean to imply 
agreement that the Government could claim an evidentiary presumption cast-
ing the burden of rebuttal on Hamdi, or that an opportunity to litigate before a 
military tribunal might obviate or truncate enquiry by a court on habeas pro-
cedural components suggested by the plurality.” (citations omitted)). 
 325. See id. at 549 (arguing that the Administration’s official position that 
Hamdi was not “entitled to prisoner of war status” is “at odds with its claim 
here to be acting in accordance with customary law of war”). But see Curtis A. 
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2048, 2095–96 (2005) (arguing that Justice Sou-
ter confused the “distinction between international law rules that are conditions 
precedent for the exercise of authorized powers, and those that are not,” and 
that if Hamdi was mistakenly classified as an unlawful combatant as opposed 
to a prisoner of war, then “that would simply mean that Hamdi’s treatment 
was not statutorily authorized, not that Hamdi’s detention was unauthorized”). 
 326. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 549 (citing Third Geneva Convention, supra note 
182, art. 4). 
 327. See id. at 549–50. 
 328. Id. at 551. 
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under Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention. In light of this 
analysis, his circumspection about the government’s failure to 
comply with the “customary law of war” is puzzling.  
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the “laws and usages 
of war” were inapplicable to Hamdi’s detention because he is a 
U.S. citizen.329 He called into question the plurality’s determi-
nation that detention is a “fundamental incident of waging 
war,” and thus its conclusion that the broad language of the 
AUMF constituted congressional authorization for Hamdi’s de-
tention.330 The dispositive issue for Justice Scalia was Hamdi’s 
status as a U.S. citizen.331 He therefore skirted the issue of 
humanitarian law altogether; for him, the key inquiry was not 
what the Geneva Conventions guaranteed Hamdi, but what the 
Constitution guaranteed him.332 Ultimately, in Justice Scalia’s 
view, absent a formal suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, 
Hamdi should have been charged or released.333 
Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, proffered the most 
cryptic reference to humanitarian law. He agreed with the plu-
rality’s conclusion that the AUMF represented congressional 
authorization for Hamdi’s detention, but argued that the plu-
rality unduly restricted this authority by limiting it to periods 
of active combat.334 “[T]he power to detain,” Justice Thomas ar-
gued, “does not end with the cessation of formal hostilities.”335 
He thus rejected the applicability of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion altogether, stating flatly, “I do not believe that we may di-
minish the Federal Government’s war powers by reference to a 
treaty and certainly not to a treaty that does not apply.”336 
Justice Thomas did not explain why the Third Convention 
does not apply. Presumably, he adopted the Fourth Circuit’s 
 
 329. See id. at 567–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Government justifies 
imprisonment of Hamdi on principles of the law of war and admits that, ab-
sent the war, it would have no such authority. But if the law of war cannot be 
applied to citizens where courts are open, then Hamdi’s imprisonment without 
criminal trial is no less unlawful than Milligan’s trial by military tribunal.”). 
 330. See id. at 574 n.5. 
 331. See supra note 329. 
 332. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 574 n.5 (“That captivity may be consistent 
with the principles of international law does not prove that it also complies 
with the restrictions that the Constitution places on the American Govern-
ment’s treatment of its own citizens.”).  
 333. See id. at 572. 
 334. See id. at 587–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 335. Id. at 588. 
 336. See id. 
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conclusion that the Convention is not self-executing.337 A later 
footnote offered only the following clarification: “Hamdi’s deten-
tion comports with the laws of war, including the Third Geneva 
Convention.”338 Justice Thomas also seemed to claim support 
for his expansive view of inherent executive wartime detention 
authority in the law of war.339 
In sum, the dissenting Justices’ treatment of humanitarian 
law is as splintered as the plurality’s. Justice Scalia couched 
his disagreement in terms of the plurality’s misreading of its 
precedent and other authorities by not giving sufficient weight 
to the citizen/alien distinction.340 He did not explicitly engage 
the majority’s reliance on Quirin for the proposition that deten-
tion as such is “a fundamental incident of war.”341 Rather, Jus-
tice Scalia disagreed with the inference that such a proposition 
equally authorized detention for aliens and U.S. citizens 
alike.342 Justice Scalia’s disagreement, therefore, does not seem 
to be with the majority’s emphasis on the centrality of deten-
tion to the law of war. Meanwhile, as evidenced by his cursory 
reliance on the government’s brief for the proposition that 
Hamdi’s detention “comports with . . . the Third Geneva Con-
vention,”343 Justice Thomas was plainly uninterested in the 
prospect that the Geneva Conventions might play any role in 
the Court’s decision.  
 
 337. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468–69 (4th Cir. 2003), judg-
ment vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). In a remarkable dissent from the Court’s 
denial of certiorari in Noriega v. Pastrana, Justice Thomas provided further 
clues as to how he would dispose of Geneva claims. 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1008–09 
(2010) (suggesting that addressing the constitutionality of the Military Com-
missions Act’s proscription on detainees’ invocation of the Geneva Conventions 
would allow the Court to reach the question of whether the conventions are 
self-executing and judicially enforceable). 
 338. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 597 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for 
Respondents at 22–24, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)). 
 339. See id. at 597–98 (arguing that the difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween military necessity and expediency “does not serve to distinguish this 
case because it is also consistent with the laws of war to detain enemy combat-
ants exactly as the Government has detained Hamdi. This, in fact, bolsters my 
argument [above] to the extent that the laws of war show that the power to 
detain is part of a sovereign’s war powers.”). 
 340. See id. at 569–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 341. See id. at 519 (plurality opinion) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 
30–31 (1942)); id. at 548–49 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 
317 U.S. 1 (1942)). 
 342. See id. at 575 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 343. See supra note 338 and accompanying text. 
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The common thread underlying the Court’s various opin-
ions is that none undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the 
humanitarian law issues at stake. The opinions do not identify 
the relevant conflict, which in turn triggers the applicability of 
different provisions of the Conventions. Nor do they assess 
Hamdi’s status under the law of war. The Court’s treatment of 
IHL in Hamdi thus suggests that the Court is institutionally 
ill-equipped for—and some members of the Court patently un-
interested in—systematically engaging the Geneva Conven-
tions. 
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
The Court’s most remarkable analysis of humanitarian law 
appears in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.344 Commentators have 
pointed to Hamdan as a landmark from the day it was handed 
down on June 29, 2006.345 In the context of this Article, howev-
er, while noteworthy for its humanitarian law analysis, the de-
cision was not as radical a procedural departure from the 
Court’s historical reticence to consider Geneva law as might 
first appear. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion made clear that 
the Court relied on the Geneva Conventions only to the extent 
the UCMJ incorporated the law of war.346 Still, quite apart 
from the question of judicial enforceability, the decision is re-
markable for its novel and controversial interpretation of the 
Geneva Conventions.347  
 
 344. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 345. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, A Supreme Court Conversation: The Most 
Important Decision on Presidential Power. Ever., SLATE (June 29, 2006, 5:50 
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2144476/entry/2144825. 
 346. See infra notes 374–76 and accompanying text. The legislative re-
sponse to the Hamdan decision, however, offers a strong argument in favor of 
judicial enforceability. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions 
Act, the Geneva Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 73, 76 n.30 (2007) (noting that the provisions of the Military Commis-
sions Act “curtail[ing] judicial enforcement of the Geneva Conventions would 
be superfluous” if the Conventions were not judicially enforceable). For criti-
cism of the Military Commissions Act in light of the Geneva Conventions, see 
James G. Stewart, The Military Commissions Act’s Inconsistency with the Ge-
neva Conventions: An Overview, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 26 (2007). See also Jen-
nifer Trahan, Military Commission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do They 
Satisfy International and Constitutional Law?, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 780, 
820–21 (2007) (finding difficulty in construing the Military Commission Act 
provisions not to violate Common Article 3). 
 347. The Hamdan decision is long and complex. This Article addresses 
solely its engagement with humanitarian law. For a brief, yet comprehensive, 
summary of the decision, see Gregory E. Maggs, Symposium on the New Face 
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Hamdan was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan 
during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban in 
November 2001, transported to Guantánamo Bay in June 2002, 
and charged in mid-2004 with one count of “conspiracy to com-
mit . . . offenses triable by military commission.”348 Hamdan’s 
January 2006 habeas petition alleged that the military com-
mission convened to try him was unlawful because it violated 
the Third Geneva Convention.349 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari after a panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded that the 
Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable, and in any 
event, that Hamdan was not entitled to their protections.350 
The Court, by marked contrast, held that Common Article 3 
applied to the military commission convened to try Hamdan, 
and that the commission was unlawful because it did not com-
ply with its provisions.351  
That the Court reached the merits is itself remarkable in 
light of several jurisdictional hurdles352 and a history of judicial 
deference to the executive on questions of national security.353 
Indeed, the Court may well have declined to accept certiorari 
following the D.C. Circuit’s approval of the government’s posi-
 
of Armed Conflict: Enemy Combatants After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 971, 976–83 (2007). 
 348. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 349. See Hamdan Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 301, at 36–50. 
 350. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38–42 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006). The panel based its opinion almost entirely on Justice Jack-
son’s footnote in Eisentrager, described in supra Part I, which stated that “re-
sponsibility for observance and enforcement of [the 1929 Geneva Convention] 
is upon the political and military authorities.” See id. at 39 (quoting Johnson 
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950)). 
 351. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 625–35. 
 352. The Court rejected the government’s motion to dismiss on the ground 
that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 
2738, deprived the Court of jurisdiction. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572–84. The 
Court also rejected the applicability of the common-law rule that civilian 
courts should await final outcome of a military proceeding before passing on 
the legitimacy of the tribunal. See id. at 584–90. 
 353. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 433–34, 451 (2004) (failing 
to consider whether the President has authority to detain a U.S. citizen as an 
“enemy combatant” while reversing and remanding on jurisdictional grounds). 
But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–37 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that “due process demands some system for a citizen-detainee to re-
fute his classification” as such); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) 
(“[F]ederal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive’s 
potentially indefinite detention of [Guantanamo Bay detainees] who claim to 
be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.”). 
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tion.354 Instead, the Court engaged humanitarian law in two 
ways: (1) by holding that the offense with which Hamdan was 
charged did not constitute a violation of the law of war, and (2) 
by holding that the military commission violated Common Ar-
ticle 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The following analyzes each 
determination in turn. 
a. Probing Humanitarian Law to Define “Conspiracy” 
In the absence of congressional authorization for the specif-
ic commission convened to try Hamdan, the Court looked to 
humanitarian law to define the charge levied against him.355 
Clarifying its prior pronouncements about the jurisdiction of 
military commissions, the Court distinguished between three 
types of commissions.356 The jurisdiction of Hamdan’s commis-
sion, once established as an “incident to the conduct of war,” 
was limited to offenses against the law of war.357 As in Quirin, 
Yamashita, and Eisentrager, then, the Court had to determine 
whether the charge against Hamdan stated a violation of the 
law of war.358  
Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality of the Court on the 
question of whether the charge was triable by military commis-
sion;359 having concluded that the commission violated Com-
mon Article 3, Justice Kennedy did not reach the issue.360 
Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit offenses in-
 
 354. See Peter J. Spiro, International Decisions: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 100 
AM. J. INT’L L. 888, 892–93 (2006) (describing the Court’s “institutional forti-
tude” in light of prior judicial practice). 
 355. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594–95 (holding that the UCMJ, AUMF, 
and DTA “at most” confer a general authority on the President to convene mil-
itary tribunals “where justified under the ‘Constitution and laws,’ including 
the law of war” (citing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 
§ 1005(e)(3)(D)(ii))).  
 356. The three types of military commissions are identified as (1) those 
“substituted for civilian courts . . . where martial law has been declared,” see 
id. at 595 (plurality opinion); (2) those established “as part of a temporary mil-
itary government over occupied” territory in the absence of civilian govern-
ment, see id. at 595–96 (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 
(1946)); and (3) those established as an “incident to the conduct of war” as 
needed “to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in 
their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of 
war,” see id. at 596 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 357. See id. at 596–97. 
 358. See id. at 597. 
 359. See id. at 595–613. 
 360. See id. at 653–55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
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cluding attacking civilians and terrorism.361 The alleged con-
spiracy extended from 1996 to November 2001 and included 
four overt acts ascribed to Hamdan, none of which in itself con-
stituted a law-of-war violation.362 To determine whether “con-
spiracy” constituted a violation of the law of war, the plurality 
drew on both domestic and international sources.363 It relied, 
for example, on Winthrop’s treatise to conclude that the offense 
alleged must have been committed in a theater of war and dur-
ing the relevant conflict, problems for the conspiracy charge as 
no overt act was alleged to have occurred after September 11, 
2001.364 The plurality also observed that the charge of conspir-
acy does not appear in the Geneva or Hague Conventions, while 
the Third Geneva Convention does extend liability for other 
acts.365 After reviewing these sources, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the admittedly high threshold366 for defining the 
charge as an offense against the law of war was not met, and 
therefore that the commission “lack[ed] authority to try Ham-
dan.”367 
b. Finding a Violation of Common Article 3 
The Court then determined that the procedures of Ham-
dan’s commission violated Common Article 3 of the Conven-
tions. Notwithstanding the procedural caveat described above, 
 
 361. The charging document stated that Hamdan “willfully and knowingly 
joined an enterprise of persons who shared a common criminal purpose and 
conspired and agreed with [named members of al Qaeda] to commit the follow-
ing offenses triable by military commission: attacking civilians; attacking civil-
ian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism.” Id. at 569–
70 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 362. See id. at 570 (describing the acts and time frame); id. at 600 (“None 
of the overt acts that Hamdan is alleged to have committed violates the law 
of war.”). 
 363. The Court drew heavily from Quirin, which it characterized as the 
“high-water mark of military power to try enemy combatants for war crimes,” 
id. at 597, and later pointed to as support for Hamdan’s argument that con-
spiracy is not a violation of the law of war because it emphasized completed 
acts, unlike Hamdan’s nascent efforts, id. at 606–07.  
 364. See id. at 597–600. 
 365. See id. at 603–04 & n.36 (noting liability “for substantive war crimes 
to those who ‘orde[r]’ their commission” (citing Third Geneva Convention, su-
pra note 182, art. 129)). The plurality also pointed out that the Nuremberg 
Tribunal refused to recognize conspiracy as a violation of the law of war. See 
id. at 610. 
 366. See id. at 603 (pointing out that the offense in Quirin was recognized 
as such by “universal agreement and practice” though admitting that the bar 
was “arguably” lower in Yamashita—a rather striking understatement). 
 367. See id. at 611–12. 
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this holding is indeed a landmark in the Court’s humanitarian 
law jurisprudence. It represents the only time in its history 
that the Court clearly and explicitly has found any provision of 
Geneva law to apply to a petitioner—even if via its incorpora-
tion by statute, the UCMJ.368 It also represents the Court’s first 
and only reference to Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conven-
tions. 
The Court reviewed the D.C. Circuit’s bases for dismissing 
Hamdan’s Geneva claims one by one.369 First, it reviewed the 
determination that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially 
enforceable.370 Its analysis deftly sidestepped the question of 
whether the Conventions are self-executing.371 Recognizing the 
circuit court’s heavy reliance on certain language in Eisentrag-
er to conclude that “the 1949 Geneva Convention does not con-
fer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its provisions in court,”372 
the Court stated that this language is “[b]uried in a footnote of 
the opinion” and “[w]hatever else might be said about the Ei-
sentrager footnote, it does not control this case.”373  
Still, the Court bent over backward to harmonize the Ei-
sentrager footnote with its holding as to the applicability of 
Common Article 3, emphasizing that it was not addressing the 
rights conferred on Hamdan by the Geneva Conventions.374 
Rather, the law of war’s incorporation into the UCMJ man-
dated compliance with the Geneva Conventions quite apart 
 
 368. See id. at 627–28 (noting that Article 21 of the UCMJ covers compliance 
with the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions). 
 369. In addition to the two bases discussed below, the D.C. Circuit also 
suggested that even if Hamdan is entitled to the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions, precedent demanded abstention from the question of whether 
the military commission violated Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention. 
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548 U.S. 557. 
The Supreme Court clarified the circuit court’s conflation of these “two distinct 
inquiries” in rejecting its Article 3 argument on the merits. See Hamdan, 548 
U.S. at 589 n.20.  
 370. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 626–28. 
 371. See id. (focusing on the fact that the Geneva Conventions are “part of 
the law of war” rather than considering whether the Conventions are self-
executing). 
 372. See id. at 627 (quoting Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40). For a summary of 
the Eisentrager footnote, see supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.  
 373. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 627. 
 374. See id. at 627–28 (“We may assume that ‘the obvious scheme’ of the 
1949 Conventions is identical in all relevant respects to that of the 1929 Gene-
va Convention, and even that that scheme would, absent some other provision 
of law, preclude Hamdan’s invocation of the Convention’s provisions as an in-
dependent source of law binding the Government’s actions and furnishing pe-
titioner with any enforceable right.”). 
  
1406 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1339 
 
from whatever rights they may or may not confer upon Ham-
dan.375 In short, regardless of the Convention’s effect were it 
invoked as an independent source of rights, the dispositive fac-
tor was its status as a component of the law of war, with which 
Article 21 of the UCMJ mandated compliance.376 The Court 
thus evaded the question of whether the Convention is self-
executing.377 Therefore, while it went on to pronounce Article 3 
applicable to Hamdan, the Court arguably left the nettlesome 
Eisentrager footnote unscathed.378 
Adding another layer of complexity to its (non)treatment of 
the self-executing treaty issue, the Court cited a bevy of con-
trary authorities, which suggested (1) that the Court should not 
follow Eisentrager to “assume” that the “obvious scheme” of the 
1929 Conventions was identical to that of the 1949 Conven-
tions,379 and (2) that Hamdan was not, in fact, “preclude[d]” 
from invoking the Conventions “as an independent source of 
law binding the Government’s actions”380—i.e., that the Con-
ventions did furnish him with enforceable rights.381 Unsurpri-
 
 375. See id. at 628 (“For regardless of the nature of the rights conferred on 
Hamdan, they are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the law of war. 
And compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority 
set forth in Article 21 is granted.” (internal citations omitted)); see also id. at 
642 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“There should be no doubt . . . that 
Common Article 3 is part of the law of war . . . .”). 
 376. See id. at 627–28. 
 377. See Aya Gruber, Who’s Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 
1041–84 (2007) (criticizing the Court’s failure to address the self-executing 
treaty issue as going beyond mere judicial temperance and situating this ap-
proach in a broader context of jurisprudential and political isolationism). 
 378. But see id. at 1039–40 (describing the argument that the Court’s in-
terpretation of the UCMJ implied that the Geneva Conventions are self-
executing (citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 716–17)). 
 379. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 627 n.57 (majority opinion) (employing the 
“[b]ut see, e.g.” signal to reference the authoritative commentaries to the Third 
and Fourth Geneva Conventions, which state respectively that “[i]t was not 
. . . until the Conventions of 1949 . . . that the existence of ‘rights’ conferred on 
prisoners of war was affirmed,” Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, supra note 57, at 
91, and that the 1949 Conventions were written “first and foremost to protect 
individuals, and not to serve State interests,” Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, 
supra note 276, at 21). 
 380. See id. at 627–28. 
 381. See INT’L COMMENTARY OF THE RED CROSS, I GENEVA CONVENTION 
FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN 
ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter Pictet, 
FIELD COMMENTARY]; Hamdan, 542 U.S. at 628 n.58 (employing the “[b]ut see 
generally” signal to refer to a brief and commentaries supporting the proposi-
tion that Hamdan was furnished enforceable rights under the Geneva Conven-
tions) (citing Brief for Louis Henkin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
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singly, the Court was unwilling to denounce the Eisentrager 
footnote or to clarify the domestic status of the 1949 Conven-
tions notwithstanding this profusion of contrary authority. 
Second, the Court addressed the D.C. Circuit’s holding that 
even if Hamdan were able to invoke the Geneva Conventions, 
he would not be entitled to their protections because he was 
captured in the war with al Qaeda—a conflict that “evades [the 
Conventions’] reach” because al Qaeda is not a “high contract-
ing party,” as required by Article 2.382 The Court sidestepped 
this argument entirely: “We need not decide the merits of this 
argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva 
Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is 
not one between signatories.”383 That provision is Common Ar-
ticle 3, which applies to conflicts “not of an international char-
 
tioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 507 (2006) (No. 05-184); Pictet, POW 
COMMENTARY, supra note 57; Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 276). 
The Court particularly highlighted language from the official commentary to 
the First Geneva Convention stating that “[i]t should be possible in States 
which are parties to the Convention . . . for the rules of the Convention . . . to 
be evoked before an appropriate national court by the protected person who 
has suffered the violation.” Id. (quoting Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra 
note 277, at 84). 
 382. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628–29 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 
F.3d 33, 41–42 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Arguing that the war with al Qaeda was sep-
arate from the war with the Taliban, the Bush Administration contended that 
because Article 2 makes applicable the full protections of the Conventions only 
to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise be-
tween two or more High Contracting parties,” and because al Qaeda is not a 
high contracting party, the full protections of the Geneva Conventions did not 
apply. See Hamdan Government Brief, supra note 206, at 38–39 (quoting 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 2). Nor did the provisions of 
Common Article 3 apply because the war against al Qaeda is not an “armed 
conflict not of an international character,” given its global reach. See id. at 48 
(quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 3); see also Memoran-
dum from George W. Bush, U.S. President, to Richard Cheney, U.S. Vice Pres-
ident et al., On the Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees pa-
ra. 2 (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf (citing Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, 
art. 3) (setting forth the Bush Administration’s official position on the applica-
bility of certain Geneva Convention provisions to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees). 
 383. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629. Because the Court determined that the mil-
itary commission was unlawful for other reasons, it “reserved” the question of 
whether Hamdan was entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war under Article 
5 of the Third Geneva Convention until a “competent tribunal” determined 
otherwise. See id. at 629 n.61. But see Michael W. Lewis, International Myo-
pia: Hamdan’s Shortcut to “Victory,” 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 687, 700–01 (2008) 
(arguing that the Court’s interpretation of Common Article 3 “effectively fore-
closed” the possibility of revisiting the applicability of Common Article 2—and 
hence the full provisions of the Convention—to the war with al Qaeda).  
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acter.”384 The Court characterized Common Article 3 as “af-
ford[ing] some minimal protection, falling short of full protec-
tion under the Conventions, to individuals associated with nei-
ther a signatory nor even a nonsignatory ‘Power’ who are 
involved in a conflict ‘in the territory of ’ a signatory.”385 
In effect, the D.C. Circuit had agreed with the Bush Ad-
ministration’s argument that Hamdan fell into a gap between 
Articles 2 and 3. On the one hand, Article 2—and hence the full 
provisions of the Convention—was not applicable because al 
Qaeda is not a state.386 On the other hand, Article 3 was not 
triggered because the conflict with al Qaeda is “international in 
scope.”387 Without clarifying the relevant conflict, the Court 
applied Common Article 3 broadly to encompass “the armed 
conflict during which Hamdan was captured.”388 The term “con-
flict not of an international character,” the Court held, simply 
means a conflict not between states.389 The Court’s analysis 
was textual: it compared the functioning of Article 3 to that of 
Article 2 to establish the applicability of the former.390 
Throughout its discussion the Court made liberal use of the 
Commentaries to the Third and Fourth Conventions, and also 
quoted the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY)391 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
the latter through reliance on a U.S. Army JAG Law of War 
Textbook.392  
 
 384. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 3. 
 385. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630. 
 386. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548 
U.S. 557. 
 387. See id. at 41–42. 
 388. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628. 
 389. See id. at 630 (“The term ‘conflict not of an international character’ is 
used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.”); see also Antho-
ny Clark Arend, Who’s Afraid of the Geneva Conventions? Treaty Interpreta-
tion in the Wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 709, 718–21 
(2007) (discussing the Court’s use of sources to determine that Article 3 ap-
plied to the conflict in which Hamdan was captured).  
 390. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630. 
 391. See id. at 631 n.63 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, De-
cision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 102 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www 
.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm). 
 392. See id. (citing BRIAN J. BILL ET AL., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW 
DEP’T; JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S SCH., U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP 
DESKBOOK 228 n.26 (2000), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/ 
lps34259/LOW%20Deskbook%202000.pdf ). 
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The Court’s textual understanding of Common Article 3—
though supported with authorities provided by Hamdan (in the 
mere three pages of his brief that addressed the provision)393 
and by Professors Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks, and Anne-
Marie Slaughter in an amicus brief394—seems to have been 
lifted primarily from D.C. Circuit Judge Williams’s one-page 
concurrence, which itself cited no authority beyond the text for 
its analysis. Judge Williams explained:  
Common Article 3 fills the gap, providing some minimal protection for 
such non-eligibles in an “armed conflict not of an international char-
acter occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Par-
ties.” The gap being filled is the non-eligible party’s failure to be a na-
tion. Thus the words “not of an international character” are sensibly 
understood to refer to a conflict between a signatory nation and a 
non-state actor. The most obvious form of such a conflict is a civil war. 
But given the Convention’s structure, the logical reading of “interna-
tional character” is one that matches the basic derivation of the word 
“international,” i.e., between nations.395 
Having determined that Common Article 3 applied, the 
Court set about interpreting its language,396 concluding that 
 
 393. See Hamdan Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 301. 
 394. Brief for Professors Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks, & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18–27, Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Hamdan Brief ]. 
 395. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415F.3d 33, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d 548 U.S. 557. 
 396. Article 3 provides: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occur-
ring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Par-
ty to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following 
provisions: 
  (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other 
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any 
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth 
or wealth, or any other similar criteria.  
  To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at 
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: 
  (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;  
  (b) taking of hostages; 
  (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
  (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as in-
dispensable by civilized peoples. 
  (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.  
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the military commission violated Article 3’s mandate that 
Hamdan be tried by a “regularly constituted court.”397 For the 
meaning of “regularly constituted court,” the Court relied on 
the Pictet Commentary,398 the Red Cross’s study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law,399 and Justice Rutledge’s 
dissent in Yamashita, which described a military commission 
as a court “specially constituted for the particular trial.”400  
Similarly, the Court found that the military commission 
did not meet Article 3’s requirement that the tribunal afford 
“all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispens-
able by civilized peoples.”401 To define this phrase the Court 
looked to customary international law,402 of which it found Ar-
ticle 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions to be a part.403 The Court viewed Article 75 as an elabora-
tion on Common Article 3’s “all the judicial guarantees” 
provision.404 One of the guarantees listed in Article 75 is the 
 
  An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the 
conflict. 
  The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into 
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provi-
sions of the present Convention. 
  The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the le-
gal status of the Parties to the conflict. 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 182, art. 3. 
 397. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 632–33.  
 398. Id. at 632 (citing Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 276, at 
340, for the proposition that a regularly constituted court “definitely exclud[es] 
all special tribunals”). 
 399. Id. (citing ICRC, CIHL, supra note 80, at 355, for the proposition that 
a “regularly constituted court” is one “established and organised in accordance 
with the laws and procedures already in force in a country”). 
 400. Id. (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 44 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dis-
senting)); see also Green, supra note 207, at 158–69 (describing the import of 
Justice Rutledge’s dissent on Justice Stevens’s—a former Rutledge law clerk—
majority opinion). 
 401. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633 (quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra 
note 182, art. 3(1)(d)). 
 402. Id. (arguing that the phrase “must be understood to incorporate at 
least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized by custom-
ary international law”). 
 403. Id. at 633–34 (observing that the Commission “dispense[s] with the 
principles, articulated in Article 75 and indisputably part of the customary in-
ternational law, that an accused must . . . be present for his trial and must be 
privy to the evidence against him”); see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 
315, art. 75. 
 404. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 633 (quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra 
note 182, art. 3(1)(d)). 
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“right to be tried in [one’s] presence.”405 Acknowledging that the 
United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I, the Court 
observed that the United States nonetheless does not object to 
it.406 Indeed, the Court cited a law review article noting the 
U.S. view that the provision reflects customary international 
law,407 and further stated that the United States is a party to 
other instruments which contain “the same basic protections” 
as those listed in Article 75.408 The Court concluded, therefore, 
that although the requirements of Common Article 3 “are gen-
eral ones, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal sys-
tems,” they are “requirements . . . nonetheless” and Hamdan’s 
military commission failed to meet them.409 
c. The Wrong Course to the Right Conclusion? 
Criticism of Hamdan’s application and analysis of the Ge-
neva Conventions abounds. The opinion has been described as 
a departure from the Court’s usual “exceptionally thorough 
analyses when international law issues are involved.”410 In con-
trast to its lengthy past treatment of international law issues, 
the Hamdan court expends only a few pages to define the scope 
of Common Article 3, determine the requirements of a “regular-
ly constituted court,” and identify the “judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensible by civilized peoples.”411 
Still, judged not by the Court’s approach to international law 
issues generally, but by its past treatment of humanitarian 
law, the amount of analysis the Court devoted to Geneva law 
issues is substantial. Apart from quantity, how sound is its 
analysis? 
 
 405. Id. at 633–34 (quoting Additional Protocol I, supra note 315, art. 
75(4)(e)). 
 406. Id. at 633. 
 407. Id. (citing Taft, supra note 12, at 322). 
 408. Id. at 633 n.66 (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 14(3)(d), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171). 
 409. Id. at 635. 
 410. Lewis, supra note 383, at 689, 694–95 (reviewing the Court’s histori-
cal approach to international law issues, particularly treaty interpretation, 
and concluding that it “traditionally displays a very broad and deep considera-
tion of sources when interpreting both customary and international law and 
international treaties”). But cf. Arend, supra note 389, at 722–29 (arguing that 
Hamdan’s approach is congruent with the Court’s prior approach to treaty in-
terpretation). 
 411. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 625–35; see also Lewis, supra note 383, at 705–
06 (noting the comparatively cursory treatment of Geneva law issues). 
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On one end of the spectrum, some criticize the substantive 
finding that Article 3 applies to what may most accurately be 
termed a transnational armed conflict.412 The Court’s holding 
stands in marked contrast to the traditional view that Common 
Article 3 applies only to intrastate wars.413 Indeed, states’ his-
torical reluctance to admit of Article 3’s application because of 
the corresponding impingement on sovereignty highlights the 
significance of this holding.414 By finding, in effect, that Article 
3 applies regardless of how one characterizes the underlying 
conflict, the Court eschews the traditional international/non-
international bifurcation.  
On the other end of the spectrum, others accept the sub-
stantive result that Article 3 applies to the armed conflict with 
 
 412. See, e.g., Ingrid Detter, The Law of War and Illegal Combatants, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1049, 1080–85 (2007); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive 
Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 190–91 (2006) (“Thinking on the law of 
war at [the time of the drafting] simply had not developed to the point where it 
could consider the status of conflicts fought by non-state actors such as al 
Qaeda.”). A former State Department Legal Advisor has expressed similar 
skepticism. See John Bellinger, Contemporary Practice of the United States 
Relating to International Law: State Department Legal Advisor Finds Gaps in 
Legal Regime for Detention of Transnational Terrorists, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 
367, 368 (2008) (“While the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rums-
feld held that the conflict with al Qaida . . . is a non-international conflict cov-
ered by Common Article 3, I think many international legal scholars would 
question that conclusion.” (alteration in original)). One may argue that this 
criticism is premature, however, given the Court’s failure clearly to identify 
the relevant conflict, as described below. 
 413. The authoritative Commentaries, for example, are filled with refer-
ences to Article 3 as being applicable to “civil wars,” “insurrection[s],” or con-
flicts “of an internal character” involving “insurgents” or “rebels.” See INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, II GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE 
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED 
MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA 33–39 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960); Pictet, 
CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 276, at 26–34; Pictet, FIELD 
COMMENTARY, supra note 381, at 38–61; Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, supra 
note 57, at 28–44; see also Sean D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Par-
adigms in the “War on Terrorism”: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of 
Persons Deemed “Unprivileged Combatants,” 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 
1115 (2007); Rona, supra note 19, at 58–59. While the Commentaries hardly 
settle the matter—as Justice Stevens points out, they also state that “the 
scope of application of the Article must be as wide as possible,” Hamdan, 548 
U.S. at 631 (quoting Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, supra note 57, at 36)—they 
strongly suggest that the drafters did not contemplate the application of Ar-
ticle 3 to conflicts like the one at issue in Hamdan. But see Jinks, supra note 
274, at 12 (arguing that Common Article 3 is applicable to the conflict between 
the United States and al Qaeda).  
 414. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Su-
preme Court Get It Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1523, 1543–45 (2007). 
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al Qaeda, but criticize the Court’s failure to grapple explicitly 
with the nuances of humanitarian law.415 Principal among the 
opinion’s shortcomings in this respect is its failure to identify 
the relevant conflict. While most commentators and, signifi-
cantly, the Bush Administration, have read the opinion to iden-
tify an armed conflict between the United States and al Qae-
da,416 the opinion by its terms does not specify that Article 3 
applies to the broader war against al Qaeda or the “war on ter-
rorism” generally. Indeed, the opinion leaves unclear precisely 
the group of persons to whom Article 3 applies.417 On its face, 
Hamdan forecloses neither the possibility that other Geneva 
law provisions apply to Hamdan nor the possibility that Article 
3 is inapplicable to those detained outside of Afghanistan.418 
This resolution was understandably attractive to the Court: it 
allowed the majority at once to rebuff the Bush Administra-
tion’s view that certain individuals are outside the scope of IHL 
 
 415. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 383, at 706–15 (arguing that a “more com-
plete reading of the Geneva Conventions as a whole and their accompanying 
Commentaries” reveals a principle of individual accountability—“the protec-
tions of Common Article 3 are earned”—that sits in tension with the principle 
of universal applicability highlighted by the Court); Ní Aoláin, supra note 414, 
at 1529 (noting the absence of any treatment in the plurality opinion of the 
drafting history of Article 3); id. at 1547–48 (suggesting that a consideration of 
Common Article 3’s potential status as customary international law would 
have bolstered the Court’s conclusions as to the substantive rights at issue). 
For a discussion as to whether Common Article 3 has assumed customary law 
status, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS 
CUSTOMARY LAW 33–62 (1989). 
 416. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. NO. 2310.01E ¶¶ 2.2, 4.2 (Sept. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Detainee_Prgm_Dir_2310_9 
-5-06.pdf (stating that in “all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are char-
acterized, and in all other military operations,” U.S. forces “shall apply, with-
out regard to a detainee’s legal status, at a minimum the standards articu-
lated in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949”); see also 
Bellinger, supra note 412, at 368 (“Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that the conflict 
with al Qaida . . . is a non-international conflict covered by Common Article 3 
. . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
 417. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006), superseded by statute, 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; see al-
so Ní Aoláin, supra note 414, at 1551–52. Justice Kennedy, however, refers 
more specifically to “our Nation’s armed conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan” 
and “our Nation’s armed conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda.” Hamdan, 
548 U.S. at 642–43, 646 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part); see also Eran Sha-
mir-Borer, Revisiting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws of Armed 
Conflict, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 601, 608 n.40 (2007). 
 418. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628–30; see also Murphy, supra note 413, at 
1139 & n.139. But see Lewis, supra note 383, at 701 (stating that the Court’s 
opinion effectively forecloses revisiting the applicability of Article 2). 
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and to skirt thorny political and legal questions about the ex-
tent and nature of the underlying conflict. 
Yet the price of this desirable result—that IHL provides 
baseline protections in all conflicts—is the clarity of the Court’s 
analysis. Above all, Hamdan’s treatment of humanitarian law 
seems to be result driven.419 As in Hamdi, the Court sacrificed 
precision by importing provisions of humanitarian law without 
clearly explaining why such provisions are applicable. The Ar-
ticle 3 holding can usefully be understood as an attempt to seek 
a politically palatable middle ground. While clearly a repudia-
tion of the government’s position, the opinion’s studious avoid-
ance of a more rigorous IHL analysis may have sidestepped an 
even bigger defeat for the Bush Administration, namely, a re-
prise of the district court’s conclusion that Article 2 “covers the 
hostilities in Afghanistan” and hence that Hamdan was en-
titled to prisoner-of-war status.420 By intimating, without clear-
ly deciding, that the global war with al Qaeda is non-
international, the Court may have effectively foreclosed future 
claims by suspected terrorists to prisoner of war status, a cate-
gory that does not exist in non-international armed conflicts.421 
Questions about the ultimate policy implications of the 
Court’s reasoning notwithstanding,422 the substance of the 
Court’s Article 3 holding represents an unmistakable contribu-
tion to the international jurisprudence of humanitarian law. 
Since the 1949 Conventions, humanitarian law has increasing-
ly moved toward the regulation of armed conflicts between 
states and non-state actors.423 In Hamdan, the Court goes 
 
 419. Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended 
and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 331, 352 (2009) (characteriz-
ing the Court’s reasoning: “[W]e need a baseline humanitarian standard applied 
to these detainees; [Common Article 3] provides such a standard; we can get 
[Common Article 3] by finding a possibly global armed conflict with Al Qaeda.”). 
 420. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(“[Hamdan is] entitled to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention as a 
prisoner of war . . . unless and until the ‘competent tribunal’ referred to in Ar-
ticle 5 concludes otherwise.”), rev’d, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006). 
 421. See Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 
AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 49 (2009) (arguing for no status-based categories in non-
international armed conflicts); Cerone, supra note 43, at 404 (same). 
 422. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 377, at 1064 (“Hamdan allowed Congress 
to rubber stamp procedures in violation of the Geneva Conventions, while re-
taining the pretense of respect for Geneva’s principles.”). 
 423. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 325, at 2069 & n.92. The 1977 Pro-
tocols, for example, regulate a number of such conflicts. E.g., Additional Proto-
col I, supra note 315, art. 1(4). 
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beyond other bodies in making an important contribution to 
this trend. In addition to the Commentaries, the Court sup-
ported its broad reading of Article 3 with references to the simi-
larly expansive interpretations by the ICTY and ICJ.424 Yet as 
even petitioner’s brief suggests, these bodies relied on Common 
Article 3 as a manifestation of customary international law, not 
treaty law.425 The ICJ, for example, in describing Article 3 as a 
“minimum yardstick” applicable to all conflicts, plainly framed 
this understanding as a matter of customary international 
law.426 The ICTY, in turn, relied heavily on this judgment in 
noting that “the character of the conflict is irrelevant” for Ar-
ticle 3 purposes.427 The Hamdan majority, by contrast, did not 
even broach the question of Article 3’s status as customary in-
ternational law.428 Because the Court applies Article 3 as a 
matter of treaty law—through the notion of its incorporation by 
statute—it goes beyond the international sources on which it 
relies.429 The implication of the Court’s decision is difficult to 
overstate. Whether one views Hamdan as a positive step to-
ward international law’s increasing regulation of non-state ac-
tors or a dangerous encroachment into political branch preroga-
 
 424. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631 n.63. 
 425. See Hamdan Brief, supra note 394, at 49. 
 426. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113–14 (June 27) (judging the United States “accord-
ing to the fundamental general principles of humanitarian law . . . [of which] 
the Geneva Conventions are in some respects a development, and in other re-
spects no more than the expression, of such principles” and hence declining to 
consider the role of the U.S. reservation to the Convention); see also id. at 537 
(Jennings, J., dissenting) (“[T]here must be at least very serious doubts 
whether [the Geneva Conventions] could be regarded as embodying customary 
law. Even the Court’s view that the common Article 3, laying down a ‘mini-
mum yardstick’ for armed conflicts of a non-international character, are appli-
cable as ‘elementary considerations of humanity’, is not a matter free from dif-
ficulty.” (citation omitted)). 
 427. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 102 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/ 
acdec/en/51002.htm (“In an important subsequent development, States speci-
fied certain minimum mandatory rules applicable to internal armed conflicts 
in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The International 
Court of Justice has confirmed that these rules reflect ‘elementary considera-
tions of humanity’ applicable under customary international law to any armed 
conflict, whether it is of an internal or international character. Therefore, at 
least with respect to the minimum rules in common Article 3, the character of 
the conflict is irrelevant.” (citation omitted)). 
 428. Ní Aoláin, supra note 414, at 1547–48.  
 429. Shamir-Borer, supra note 417, at 612. 
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tives, the decision is a clear contribution to the international 
jurisprudence of humanitarian law.430 
3. Boumediene and Munaf 
Issued on the same day, the opinions in Boumediene v. 
Bush and Munaf v. Geren made peripheral mention to humani-
tarian law in ways not dispositive to the holdings in either case. 
Writing for a unanimous Court in Munaf, Chief Justice Roberts 
made a single reference to “the Geneva Convention.”431 In hold-
ing that the writ of habeas corpus provided no relief to U.S. cit-
izens who voluntarily traveled to Iraq and allegedly committed 
crimes there,432 Justice Roberts noted that “[i]n accordance 
with Article 5 of the Geneva Convention, [petitioner] was per-
mitted to hear the basis for his detention, make a statement, 
and call immediately available witnesses.”433  
In Boumediene, while not mentioned in the majority opin-
ion, Geneva law appeared on the periphery in Justice Roberts’s 
dissent. The Boumediene majority held that alien detainees at 
Guantánamo could invoke the Suspension Clause, allowing 
them to file habeas petitions, and that section 7 of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)434 violated that provision by 
supplanting federal habeas jurisdiction with a constitutionally 
insufficient substitute.435 As to the detainee’s access to the 
Suspension Clause, the Court engaged in a historical analy-
 
 430. It is not clear, however, that the development is a positive one for ei-
ther the integrity of IHL or the practical administration of justice. See Ander-
son, supra note 419, at 352 (“The attempt by US courts to reach conclusions 
which satisfy many different practical realities of US counter-terrorism, but 
doing so by an excursion through the Geneva Conventions, might yield good 
behavioural rules and results, but at risk of deforming the law of war as it ap-
plies to ‘ordinary’ armed conflicts.”); Ní Aoláin, supra note 414, at 1551 (ar-
guing that the Court’s failure to address the nature of the underlying conflict 
may, “in the longer term, create more problems for administration of justice in 
the context of the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’ than it solves”). 
 431. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 681 (2008). 
 432. Id. at 680. 
 433. Id. at 681. This process was afforded during petitioner’s designation 
as a “security internee” and “enemy combatant in the war on terrorism” by 
military tribunal. Id. at 682. 
 434. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. Section 7 expressly applied the 
DTA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision to both future and pending habeas peti-
tions. In effect, this provision meant that detainees whose petitions were pend-
ing at the time of the DTA could not invoke the federal habeas statute. 
 435. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793–95 (2008). The substitute was 
the system of judicial review by Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) 
and possible appellate review by the D.C. Circuit, as established by the DTA. Id. 
at 783–92. 
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sis—ultimately inconclusive—as to the extraterritorial applica-
tion of that Clause.436 The Court held that neither the status 
nor the location of petitioners could deny them the protections 
of the writ.437 As to whether section 7 of the MCA constituted a 
suspension of the writ, the Court found that the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) / Combatant Status Review Tri-
bunal system of review unquestionably limited detainees’ 
process without providing an adequate substitute.438 Neither of 
these holdings relied on humanitarian law. Indeed, the Court 
emphasized that “our opinion does not address the content of 
the law that governs petitioners’ detention.”439 Nonetheless, 
humanitarian law questions were indeed before the Court. Pe-
titioners argued that humanitarian law limited the govern-
ment’s detention authority to members of the armed forces and 
citizens who participate directly in hostilities.440 The Court did 
not address this question, and thus left unresolved the scope of 
detention authority under IHL. 
While IHL was not center stage, it played a background 
role in the Court’s adjudication of the case. Justice Roberts in 
dissent referred to the Geneva Conventions to bolster his ar-
gument that the DTA system of review was “adequate to vindi-
cate whatever due process rights petitioners may have.”441 In 
making the point that DTA procedures restricting detainee 
access to classified material were more than constitutionally 
adequate, Justice Roberts pointed out that prisoners challeng-
ing their status under the Geneva Conventions are not entitled 
to such access, and that “the prisoner-of-war model is the one 
Hamdi cited as consistent with the demands of due process for 
 
 436. Id. at 739–52. 
 437. Id. at 753–55, 765–71.  
 438. Id. at 770–92. For a brief summary of the process afforded to detain-
ees in the CSRT system, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel Meltzer, Habeas 
Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 2029, 2100 n.286 (2007). 
 439. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798. 
 440. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26–27, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1195).  
 441. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 808, 816–17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief 
Justice Roberts also observed that the DTA system of review met the majori-
ty’s standard of “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that [they are] being 
held pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law.” 
Id. at 815 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 779 (majority opinion)). Chief 
Justice Roberts would not have framed the question in terms of whether the 
DTA procedure was an adequate “substitute” for habeas; rather, the relevant 
inquiry in his view was: (1) What constitutional rights do aliens captured abroad 
have, and (2) do the DTA procedures adequately protect them? Id. at 801–03. 
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citizens.”442 If it is good enough for citizens, Justice Roberts 
reasoned, surely it is good enough for the alien petitioners. 
Similarly, encouraging the reader to “[s]tep back and consider 
what, in the real world, Congress and the Executive have ac-
tually granted aliens captured by our Armed Forces overseas 
and found to be enemy combatants,” Justice Roberts listed 
“[t]he ability to challenge the bases of their detention before 
military tribunals modeled after Geneva Convention proce-
dures.”443  
Justice Roberts’s references to Geneva law in Munaf and 
Boumediene offered no substantive analysis of the Geneva Con-
ventions. In Munaf, he merely acknowledged that petitioners 
had been afforded the opportunity to challenge the basis for 
their detention, congruent with the Conventions, a point made 
repeatedly by the government in its filings before the Court.444 
In Boumediene, Justice Roberts used Geneva law to rhetorical 
effect and as an aid in constitutional interpretation. In essence, 
the Chief Justice suggested that the DTA procedure’s similari-
ties to Geneva Convention procedures militated in favor of their 
constitutional adequacy. 
The foregoing sections demonstrate that even when explic-
itly relying on IHL provisions, the Court has been deeply reluc-
tant to address any more of that body of law than necessary. A 
recent dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari written by 
Justice Thomas stands in marked contrast to that trend. While 
it is far from clear that the dissent portends a change in the 
Court’s general approach to humanitarian law, it does suggest 
that at least two members of the Court are willing—indeed ea-
ger—to address several issues surrounding the Geneva Con-
ventions. 
4. An Emerging Change of Heart on Geneva Issues? 
The Court’s 2010 refusal to hear an appeal stemming from 
a habeas petition brought by Manuel Noriega, former head of 
the Panamanian Defense Forces, occasioned a vigorous dissent 
 
 442. Id. at 817 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004)). Rob-
erts read Hamdi to be “of pressing relevance” as establishing the procedures 
required for American citizens detained as enemy combatants. Id. at 812. If 
the DTA system “looks a lot like the procedure Hamdi blessed [for citizens],” 
id., then “surely the Due Process Clause does not afford non-citizens . . . great-
er protection than citizens are due.” Id. at 804. 
 443. Id. at 825. 
 444. E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14 n.4, Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 
674 (2008) (No. 07-394). 
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from Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia.445 While the 
denial of certiorari may itself be unremarkable,446 the strongly 
worded dissent is doubly surprising against the backdrop of the 
Court’s historical reluctance to engage the Geneva Conven-
tions. Justice Thomas, in short, appeared eager to adjudicate 
Noriega’s Geneva law claims. 
After his conviction in federal court of various narcotics-
related offenses, Noriega argued that the United States should 
treat him as a prisoner of war, and thus afford him all the pro-
tections of the Geneva Conventions. The district court agreed. 
After years in custody as a prisoner of war and shortly before 
his parole and expected extradition to France to face criminal 
charges, Noriega argued that the Third Geneva Convention 
barred his extradition. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed 
with the government’s view that section 5 of the MCA barred 
Noriega from invoking the Geneva Convention in his habeas 
proceeding.447 In declining to hear Noriega’s case, therefore, the 
Court decided not to entertain his claim that section 5 violated 
the Supremacy and Suspension Clauses of the U.S. Constitu-
tion by working a “complete repudiation” of the Third Geneva 
Convention and an “effective[]” suspension of the writ of ha-
beas corpus under Boumediene, respectively.448 
While Justice Thomas put forth several reasons why the 
Court should have engaged Noriega’s MCA arguments, he 
seemed concerned principally with “provid[ing] courts and the 
political branches with much needed guidance on issues we left 
open in Boumediene,” issues with which the lower courts have 
been grappling with since that decision.449 In highlighting the 
 
 445. Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
 446. Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empir-
ical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 729 (2001) (noting that the Court accepts 
certiorari in less than three of every one hundred cases). 
 447. Noriega, 130 S. Ct. 1004 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 448. Id. at 1005.  
 449. Id. at 1006, 1009 (“A decision upholding MCA § 5(a) would obviate the 
need for detainees, the Government and federal courts to struggle (as they did 
here) with Geneva Convention claims in habeas corpus proceedings.”). For cri-
tiques of the district court and D.C. Circuit jurisprudence to which Justice 
Thomas refers, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST & THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, 
HABEAS WORKS: FEDERAL COURTS’ PROVEN CAPACITY TO HANDLE 
GUANTÁNAMO CASES (2010), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp 
-content/uploads/pdf/Habeas-Works-final-web.pdf; BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., 
BROOKING INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO 
HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2010) available at http://www.brookings.edu/ 
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need for such guidance, Justice Thomas pointed to recent ex-
ecutive branch pronouncements about the broad applicability of 
Common Article 3 and contemplated legislation clarifying the 
extent to which detainees can enforce Geneva Convention obli-
gations against the United States. Noting that these proposals 
have been “complicated by uncertainty over [questions] in this 
case,” Justice Thomas saw Noriega’s petition as an opportunity 
to address these issues in order to “avoid years of litigation and 
uncertainty.”450  
Justice Thomas further speculated that ruling on the con-
stitutionality of section 5 of the MCA “could well allow [the 
Court] to reach the question we left open in Hamdan—whether 
the Geneva Conventions are self-executing and judicially enfor-
ceable.”451 Noriega’s case would have enabled the Court to ap-
proach the Geneva Conventions differently than in previous 
cases because it was not governed by the UCMJ provisions im-
plicated in Hamdan. Indeed, if the Court were to conclude that 
the conventions are self-executing and judicially enforceable, it 
would face two additional questions: “whether federal courts 
may classify [noncitizen] detainees as POWs under the Third 
[Geneva] Convention, and whether any of the conventions re-
quire the United States immediately to repatriate detainees” 
released from custody.452  
The dissent is remarkable not for its analysis of the Gene-
va Conventions—although this is more than Justice Thomas 
has ever observed about the Conventions in a majority or dis-
senting opinion—but rather for its willingness, indeed eager-
ness, to reach Noriega’s Geneva claims. Justice Thomas seemed 
to favor providing what would amount, in effect, to an advisory 
opinion on the judicial enforceability of the conventions for the 
benefit of the political branches and the lower courts. This wil-
lingness to engage Geneva law—seemingly engendered by low-
er court and political branch difficulties in operationalizing 
Boumediene and Hamdi—is truly a novel development. 
 
papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.aspx; Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, 
Note, Meeting Boumediene’s Challenge: The Emergence of an Effective Habeas 
Jurisprudence and Obsolescence of New Detention Legislation, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 244 (2010). 
 450. Noriega, 130 S. Ct. at 1008–09 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari).  
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  CONCLUSION   
The Supreme Court has invoked humanitarian law—
whether customary or treaty-based—from its earliest days, 
though only in a relatively small number of cases. The Court’s 
references to customary humanitarian law predate the Lieber 
Code, but, perhaps unsurprisingly, become more numerous dur-
ing and after the Civil War. Further, the Court recognizes 
foundational humanitarian law principles, including the prin-
ciple of distinction, well before codification of humanitarian law 
at the Hague and in Geneva. These features suggest that the 
Court has some role to play in interpreting and developing hu-
manitarian law. 
Broadly speaking, the Court has invoked humanitarian 
law (1) to address claims allegedly arising under the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions, (2) as a tool of constitutional interpreta-
tion, and (3) as a tool of statutory construction, or, stated differ-
ently, for reasons of definition—both to define particular con-
cepts and to concretize charges levied against an accused 
allegedly subject to trial by military tribunal. As to addressing 
claims arguably arising under IHL, the Court has been very re-
luctant to find a violation of the Conventions or to recognize 
rights allegedly conferred on individuals thereby. As to the 
Hague Conventions, this reluctance does not push the bounds 
of judicial restraint: the Court’s approach is justifiable on the 
facts of each case. Yet as to the Geneva Conventions, the trea-
ty-based component of IHL to receive the Court’s most sus-
tained attention, the question is a closer one. The Court en-
gaged in elaborate textual gymnastics in Yamashita to render 
the 1929 Convention inapplicable, but reversed course in Ham-
dan to reach the novel conclusion that Common Article 3 of the 
1949 Conventions applies as a matter of treaty law (albeit one 
incorporated via statute) to an arguably transnational armed 
conflict. A cynic thus might suggest that the Court’s willingness 
to find a violation of the Conventions may change with the po-
litical winds.  
Recourse to humanitarian law treaties to interpret the 
Constitution is infrequent. The Court has drawn on the conven-
tions only once in a majority opinion to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment bar on cruel and unusual punishment. In the 
armed conflict context, Hamdi opened the door to the sugges-
tion that detention procedures compliant with the conventions 
also satisfy the Constitution’s due process requirements, a 
point since raised as a sword in dissent by Justice Roberts. 
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The Court’s use of humanitarian law as a tool of statutory 
construction is further evidence of its reluctance to rely directly 
on the Conventions. In this regard, the Court’s early holdings 
that the 1929 Convention did not reach petitioners in Yamashi-
ta and Eisentrager—findings rooted in the Court’s Hague-law- 
based decision in Quirin—set the parameters of the Court’s 
humanitarian law analyses in the detainee cases of the “war on 
terror.” In each case, the Court takes care to point out that its 
reliance on humanitarian law is necessitated by the law of 
war’s incorporation into domestic law by statute. The Court is 
thus able consistently to evade the issue of whether the Con-
ventions are self-executing. In the process of consulting human-
itarian law to define the charges against petitioners, the Court 
offers informative if controversial analysis of particular provi-
sions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, including rooting 
the principle of command responsibility in humanitarian law. 
The Court’s IHL analysis is sometimes haphazard—
emphasizing certain concepts while ignoring others—and never 
comprehensive. In short, the Court often leaves humanitarian 
law issues unresolved, even questions essential to the resolu-
tion of issues that it does address. In the post-September 11, 
2001, detainee cases, for example, the Court’s analysis suffers 
from its steadfast refusal clearly to identify the underlying con-
flict. The Court’s single most significant contribution to human-
itarian law jurisprudence is undoubtedly its holding that Ar-
ticle 3 applies to the war with al Qaeda.453 Notwithstanding the 
host of potent criticisms to be levied against the Court’s analy-
sis, the substance of this holding advances a core principle of 
IHL: that all persons are entitled to some baseline of protec-
tion. 
One reason that the Court’s treatment of IHL is significant 
is the widely accepted proposition that the United States plays 
a major role in the development of customary international 
humanitarian law.454 The Court’s interpretation of Hague and 
Geneva law may thus contribute to the establishment of opinio 
juris or, indirectly, U.S. practice. This review of the Court’s 
humanitarian law jurisprudence suggests, however, that the 
Court is profoundly reluctant to root its holdings in humanitar-
ian law treaties. Indeed, it is the incorporation of the law of war 
 
 453. As discussed in supra notes 412–18 and accompanying text, the opin-
ion does not compel this result. Nonetheless, this reading has been adopted by 
the government and most commentators.  
 454. See, e.g., Skordas, supra note 15, at 319. 
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into domestic statute that occasions the Court’s most extensive 
analysis of IHL. On the facts before it, the Court has explicitly 
found only one violation of humanitarian law, which it likewise 
found to be compelled by statute. These features urge caution 
in attempting to establish opinio juris as to U.S. compliance 
with humanitarian law by reference to the Court’s jurispru-
dence. 
In sum, the Supreme Court may not be institutionally well-
suited to interpret and develop humanitarian law. Notwith-
standing Justice Thomas’s recent display to the contrary, the 
Court is deeply reluctant to rely on humanitarian law treaties 
and does so rarely, haphazardly, and minimally, eschewing 
comprehensive analysis of the text, structure, and history of 
the relevant provisions. Moreover, from Yamashita to Hamdan, 
the Court’s use of humanitarian law often seems result-driven, 
calculated to achieve a politically palatable outcome. Indeed, 
this feature may partially explain the lack of clarity in the 
Court’s IHL analysis. It is tempting to identify these tendencies 
as unsurprising features of a common-law court historically 
suspicious of international legal authority, and conclude ac-
cordingly that the Court has only a minimal role to play in the 
development of IHL.455 Yet this conclusion would be premature. 
The Court’s role in the development of humanitarian law is not 
insubstantial. Even when declining formally to address a claim 
allegedly arising under the Geneva or Hague Conventions, for 
example, the Court sometimes offers explicit analysis in the 
form of application of the relevant treaty provisions to the facts 
before the Court, thus producing authoritative and precedential 
interpretations of IHL. Throughout this process the Court has 
unearthed various substantive provisions of humanitarian law 
and offered a novel interpretation of at least one of them. While 
the Supreme Court’s role in developing IHL will continue to be 
limited by its reluctance directly to engage the body of law, the 
Court’s preeminence in a state crucial to shaping the interna-
tional legal order ensures that it has an important role to play. 
 
 455. The Court’s role in developing the law should be sharply distinguished 
from how it perceives the judicial task. As one recent characterization of the 
Court’s postwar treaty jurisprudence put it: “The Court that emerges is one 
that decides cases, not one that sees its primary function as our instruction 
and illumination.” Stephan, supra note 11, at 8. 
